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THE NATION

FEBRUARY 22, 1971 *35 cents*

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LETTERS

hiding the jobless

Los Angeles, Calif.

DEAR SIRS: One more factor can be added to your listing of the ways in which real unemployment has been diluted to produce the rate of official unemployment [editorial, "Unemployment: Official & Real," Jan. 25].

In 1965 the Bureau of Labor Statistics and the Bureau of the Census decided to regard trainees in some manpower programs as "employed" or "not in the labor force." Thus, those persons whose out-of-work status made them eligible for the Neighborhood Youth Corps, MDTA on-the-job training, Job Corps, nonprofessional CAP employment, or college work-study programs do not get into the unemployment statistic.

Prof. Charles C. Killingsworth of Michigan State University cites these and other examples to show how we mask, defer or ignore a sizable part of our unemployment problem. All of which, he says, means that comparing present unemployment figures with those for years prior to 1965 or 1967 is much like comparing meters to yards.

Fred H. Schmidt
Senior Lecturer and Researcher in Industrial Relations

quick answer

Rialto, Calif.

DEAR SIRS: Inspired partly by your editorial "Can a Good Man Win?" [Jan. 25] I asked a neighbor that question. His answer was: "Hell, no! Nobody but a goddamned crook can get to be President!" I don't know if my neighbor's opinion is correct, but I should like to see it published for other people's consideration. *Clifford M. Turner*

schlock

Pine Grove, Calif.

DEAR SIRS: What a good review is "Future Schlock" by Robert Claiborne in your issue of Jan. 25. Not only is the review of the Toffler book excellent but the whole devastating critique of what the author calls "schlock sociologists" is something much needed. . . . *Gregory Bergman*

teachers in trouble

DEAR SIRS: For a project to help public schoolteachers who are in trouble with their administrations, I would appreciate hearing from teachers who were fired last year, or who believe their contracts will not be renewed beyond the current year. Box 143, Clifton Forge, Va. 24422.

Hal Lenke

no show

Boston, Mass.

DEAR SIRS: On the matter of the SST I would like to go on public record as saying that if this plane is built I will not under any circumstances fly on it, and furthermore, that wherever I have the choice of flying on an airline that is using them and one that is not, I shall pick the latter. I urge everyone who feels as I do about the SST to take a similar public position. I further suggest that another practical way to discourage the government in its plans for pursuing this reckless and foolhardy adventure, is wherever possible to stay off the 747s. Let's get the technocrats back into their kennels. *John Holt*

brothers in truth

Great Falls, Mont.

DEAR SIRS: I have always been a *Nation* subscriber because it has always published the whole truth, printed by no one else except *The Wall Street Journal*. *O. W. Francis*

EDITORIALS

Air Power over Indochina

After World War I, the Italian Gen. Giulio Douhet propounded the doctrine that command of the air could win a war despite enemy superiority on the ground and at sea. World War II showed that, while the air weapon could be highly destructive, especially to civilians, it was not omnipotent, partly because of improved countermeasures, partly because of its inherent inaccuracy.

Despite a similar experience in Korea, President Johnson was persuaded by Air Force generals that bombing North Vietnam would bring victory. It did not. The same experiment is now being repeated in Laos, supplemented by a resumption, limited so far, of the bombing of North Vietnam. The main effort involves invasion of Laos by South Vietnam with utmost support by all varieties of American air power, ranging from B-52s (30 tons of bombs apiece) to rocket-firing helicopters *and* helicopters ferrying South Vietnamese troops into battle.

If the South Vietnamese commit their best troops and receive unlimited American air support, it would be surprising if they could not cut the so-called Ho Chi Minh Trail at one or more points and destroy some supply depots. But the "trail" is actually a shifting network of primitive roads and footpaths, and the flow of supplies will be interdicted only as long as the Americans maintain air action and where the South Vietnamese occupy the terrain. If they withdraw, the North Vietnamese will resume their use of the portion of the network that had been affected. Neither South Vietnamese action on the ground, nor American bombing, taken alone, will suffice.

Thus President Nixon has the choice of failing to achieve the objective, as in Cambodia, or sanctioning permanent occupation of southern Laos by the South Vietnamese, with continued American logistic and air support. It is hardly an enviable choice, and it will not be made easier by the forces of the Pathet Lao and the North Vietnamese, who can do pretty much what they please in the rest of Laos. If air support is turned over to the South Vietnamese, the North Vietnamese may, with Soviet aid, expand their air force likewise. If so, the opposed land armies can for the first time fight on equal terms, and there is not much doubt as to the result.

The chances are, therefore, that the U.S. air generals will have been proved wrong once again. All that will have been accomplished is the permanent widening of the war, as in July 1970. And the further Mr. Nixon extends the war, the harder it will be to end it.

Don't Forget China

In one respect the Laos invasion differs decisively from the Cambodian invasion, and the difference makes it far more hazardous. Laos has a common border with Communist China. Thailand"s northern border is close to China—about 80 miles at the nearest point, or four minutes in a supersonic fighter. This geography had better be taken into account.

One may doubt that President Nixon is temperamen-

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tally able to acknowledge the risks of a U.S.-China confrontation. In 1954, when he was Vice President, he and Admiral Radford wanted to come to the aid of the French garrison trapped at Dienbienphu, reportedly with nuclear bombs if necessary. There is no sign that his judgment has improved.

Former U.S. Sen. Wayne Morse, one of America's most able analysts of foreign policy, said at a recent press conference in San Francisco that Mr. Nixon's Asian policies, if unchecked, will lead to an all-out war with China—a war in which the United States would probably stand alone. He pointed out that we do not have the manpower for such a war. Experience with non-nuclear bombing indicates that the air arm itself cannot conquer a small country like Laos, much less the giant China. According to Mr. Morse, it was the view of Robert S. McNamara, when he was Secretary of Defense, that not only aerial bombing on a vast scale but also 3 million foot soldiers would be needed to cope with China, even if nuclear weapons were brought to bear.

The Chinese, we know, are cautious. During the Korean War they remained aloof, but as General MacArthur approached the Yalu they sent repeated warnings through Indian diplomatic channels, and when these warnings were ignored they moved. Man for man, and with equal weapons, the Chinese foot soldier is at least as formidable as the American. Our people are superior technologically: from a purely military standpoint, one can only admire the agility with which the U.S. Army engineers and other units reactivated the base at Khesanh. But we had better not take on the Chinese.

The risk is that, without intending it, we may be dragged into such a situation as we abet the South Vietnamese militarists logistically and with air power in the forays into Laos. There are understandings, perhaps only nebulous at the moment, among the rightist generals of Cambodia, Laos, South Vietnam and Thailand. Thai troops are operating in Laos now, and if the Ho Chi Minh "trail" is shifted to the west the Thais may react in accordance with their interest which, together with their opposite numbers in the other countries of Indochina (with the exception of North Vietnam), is to batten on American aid. The United States has commitments in Thailand, the scope of which is known only in the top echelons of the Pentagon, the CIA and the Administration. The present American incursion into Laos appears to have been initiated by Thieu and CIA people who have long been operating in Laos. Repeated often enough, it may have results that are not envisoned under the Nixon doctrine.

The Budget Game

All administrations play it, but none has ever shown the audacity—to use the least pejorative term—of President Nixon. None of his predecessors has exhibited his talent for calculated manipulation of the nation's finances. The crucial question is: Can he get away with it?

The budget is the most easily manipulated of public documents. Hardly anybody reads it, nor is it meant to be read. It runs to about 600 pages, backed up by a 1,000-page appendix. What people read is the budget message,

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addressed to the Congress, and beginning in this case with a political claim in typical Nixon style: "In the 1971 budget [July 1970 to July 1971] America's priorities were quietly but dramatically reordered: For the first time in twenty years, we spent more to meet human needs than we spent on defense." In the next sentence, he cautions against any expectation of a continuance of this halcyon state of affairs: "In 1972, we must increase our spending for defense in order to carry out the nation's strategy for peace." And more flimflam: the budget "introduces a new fairness in American life. . . ."

While spouting in this fashion, Mr. Nixon was planning the widening of the Indochinese war by the invasion of Laos, but the budget omits mention of the expected cost of the war in fiscal 1972. The Pentagon explains that stating such a figure would give away our plans to the enemy. This year it is getting $74.5 billion. The President wants to allocate $76 billion for next year which, with the usual supplemental appropriations, is likely to rise to $80 billion, or about 2.7 times as much as the maximum estimates for human resources spending.

Throughout, it is a political budget and, again, that is the kindest word that can be applied. James Reston's headline is, "Poker Player's Gamble"; Hobart Rowen's is "Credibility Is Lacking in Nixon Budget"; Joseph Kraft says "An Economic Con Game"; Mankiewicz & Braden, "Defense Budget Hoax." Even some of Mr. Nixon's active consultants are asking how he arrives at that gross national product of $1,065 billion in 1971. Alan Greenspan makes it $1,045 billion, and Pierre Rinfret arrives at the same figure. Dr. Rinfret thus implies a federal deficit of $30 billion for fiscal 1972, compared to Mr. Nixon's predicted deficit of only $11.6 billion. Insiders say that the President's own economists stretched the GNP to $1,052 billion with some reluctance when the private "standard forecasts" ranged from $1,045 billion to $1,050 billion. But their estimate was "unacceptable" to the President, who insisted that it be jacked up another $13 billion.

What is he up to? First of all he hopes to inspire confidence among businessmen and the buying public, especially among big businessmen with capital to invest in plant expansion. He has said that a "full-employment budget" is in the nature of a self-fulfilling prophecy: "By operating as if we were at full employment we will help to bring about full employment," even, one may add, if it requires something analogous to check kiting. But he has another consideration in mind. By placing an extremely high estimate on GNP, he hopes to minimize, for the time being, the amount of the deficit that is being projected. The President's economists may have qualms —some of them are known to be shivering—but Mr. Nixon thinks he can bull it through.

We doubt that he can but, more important, his irresponsible sleight of hand with the budget transcends the politically permissible manipulation of the figures on which that document is based. The public has come to expect that any administration will project its budgetary forecasts in the most favorable light, but there are limits to this tolerance and Mr. Nixon has exceeded them. Instead of inspiring confidence, his inflated estimate of GNP may arouse even deeper skepticism. He is not fooling the forecasters or the business community.

And the Jobless

While relying on juggled budget figures to relieve unemployment before he must stand for re-election, Mr. Nixon is reluctant to provide jobs for those who lack them right now. Last year, at the instance of Sen. Alan Cranston, the Senate passed a measure to create or assist public service employment on a *permanent* basis, by which was meant that the setup would be there all the time, but come into use only as need arose. Cranston's bill would have appropriated some $750 million in 1971, $1 billion in 1972, and so on. It was not geared to any current rate of unemployment, but was designed to cope with the emergency aspects of joblessness, provide standards for the jobs created, and assure that they were related to useful projects.

The House passed a companion bill, which cut down on funds and made some other modifications. The bill went to conference and the conferees accepted the substance of the Senate version, but scaled down the amounts still further—$200 million the first year and rising by $200 million each year. Mr. Nixon vetoed the bill.

The gist of his veto message was that as much as 44 per cent of the total funding went for "dead-end jobs in the public sector." He complained that there was no requirement that these public sector jobs be linked to training or the prospect of "other" employment opportunities, i.e., in the private sector, where for the time being they did not exist. "WPA-type jobs," he said, "are not the answer for the men and women who have them, for government which is less efficient as a result, or for the taxpayers who must foot the bill. Such a program represents a reversion to the remedies that were tried thirty-five years ago."

The President thus joined the campaign of derogation which some Republicans, and most of those who call themselves conservatives, have imposed on WPA over the years. The truth is that in the thirties it was discovered that relief was not enough—people needed jobs to maintain their morale, or to regain it. Having learned that lesson, the New Deal shifted to work projects. For a period of about three years, WPA was the dominant mode of helping the jobless. All America benefited from that program—post offices, school buildings, roads, streets, sewers, libraries, theatrical companies, etc. There was some leaf-raking, some corruption, but on balance the program was a splendid success. To some extent we are still living off the fat of those "dead-end" jobs.

This year Senator Cranston is trying again, in partnership with Sen. Gaylord Nelson and Sen. Jacob Javits. Other sponsors of the bill include twenty-seven of the most respected Senators, both Republicans and Democrats. Under the bill, called the Emergency Employment Act, federal job-raising funds would be released whenever the national unemployment rate goes over 4.5 per cent. At the present unemployment rate of 6 per cent, the bill would create an estimated 200,000 new jobs by authorizing $800 million a year to put people to work in state and local service. If the unemployment rate rises to 7 per cent for three consecutive months, the authorization would go up to $1 billion. If the rate drops to 4.5 per cent, the program would be phased out.

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The present version is an emergency measure. Cranston's original idea was better, but he had to transform it to get bipartisan support and important sponsors. The compromise is the best thing of its kind in sight, and should receive top priority. And if it reaches the President and he still has his benighted notions about WPA, it should be passed over his veto.

Winter Soldier

The veterans coming home from America's latest war are more complex than the old types, disillusioned, haunted by questioning. Thanks to Sen. George McGovern and Rep. John Conyers, a black Congressman from Detroit, official Washington may soon get to know them in sizable numbers.

One of the new vets is Tim Butz, 23, of Monroe Falls, Ohio. He looks like the typical neighborhood hippie—medium-length hair, mustache, granny glasses—and he hopes that an organization called Vietnam Veterans Against the War will be the "viable alternative to the VFW" that he is seeking.

"I think we have the foundation here for a group that can stop the war," he said. "America has always identified with Johnny-comes-marching-home. Well, this time he's coming home with the peace sign and love beads and he's probably had dope experience over there. We're not hippie freaks, we're vets. We're America."

The VVAW was the moving force last week behind a long, somber hearing largely ignored by the national media, and called the Winter Soldier Investigation. For three days, in the improbable setting of a Detroit Howard Johnson motel, more than 100 veterans testified about such excesses of American war as throwing prisoners out of helicopters, cutting off Vietcong ears, impaling decapitated heads along jungle trails, shooting women and children, and making sly and secret incursions into the supposedly neutral ground of Laos.

Only one major network, CBS, touched on the hearings at all, and that briefly. The wire services filed short stories; *The New York Times* sent reporters, but they filed no spot stories. The vets and their followers muttered about a "national news blackout" that they suppose the Nixon Administration engineered. (See "Horror Takes the Stand" by James Higgins, *The Nation*, January 4.)

The reasons for the meager coverage seem to be three: the Winter Soldier Investigation was pushed by Mark Lane and Jane Fonda, both widely distrusted by the media; many editors think readers and viewers have had a surfeit of horror stories from Vietnam; and many newsmen still seem to think that a young man who looks like a guitarist for Jefferson Airplane is a dubious witness.

The VVAW is still comparatively small: founded in New York in June 1967, by three Army and three Navy veterans, it now has forty-four chapters and claims a mailing list of 5,000. Despite the thin news coverage, the Detroit hearing may have provided the impetus it needs to get the organization rolling.

McGovern and Conyers have called for Congressional investigation of the Winter Soldier charges. Conyers seemed most moved by the atrocity stories, McGovern by sworn testimony from ex-Marines that they had probed into Laos on search-and-destroy missions as long ago as February 1969. The executive commander of the VVAW, Jan Crumb, 28, of Brooklyn, said at the close of the Detroit Winter Soldier hearings that his group was dispatching eight witnesses to Washington immediately, to be available for whatever comes up.

So the next move is up to Congress. Serious charges by apparently qualified witnesses are available, if the legislators don't mind a little long hair around the witness table.

LEE WINFREY, *Detroit Free Press*

The Oil Bombs

Oil industrialists probably excel all others in greed and shortsightedness. Even so, an article on "Mammoth Tankers" by Philip Mandell, professor of naval architecture at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (*Technology Review*, February) must inspire astonishment. Professor Mandell refrains from denunciation, but the technical data he provides speak for themselves.

The two Standard Oil of California tankers that collided a few weeks ago under the Golden Gate Bridge and produced a severely damaging oil spill were quite small—17,000 deadweight tons apiece, as compared with the ill-fated *Torrey Canyon* of 118,000 tons. But the *Torrey Canyon* had less than half the tonnage of two supertankers Standard has on order: they will carry 261,000 tons apiece. Professor Mandell points out that larger oil carriers are already in service: 300,000 tons, 1,200 feet long. Such vessels have 3.5 times the displacement of America's largest aircraft carrier. But the end, he tells us, is not yet in sight. A "megaton tanker" about 1,600 feet long is expected to be ordered soon.

Oil tankers and other large vessels are designed according to information obtained from small models in towing tanks. The research on forthcoming oil tankers is being done abroad, where large towing tanks are available. Mandell describes one at Feltham, England, that is 1,300 feet long, 48 feet wide and 25 deep. The models run to 20 to 40 feet in length. But for technical reasons it is increasingly difficult to translate the performance of the models of the next-generation tankers into reliable figures for the tankers themselves. Even the current supertankers are underpowered. In the last twenty years the size and tonnage of oil tankers has increased more than tenfold, but power plants have increased only threefold (from 10,000 to about 30,000 horsepower). This alone makes the ships much less maneuverable. For instance, if the master of a mammoth tanker of the current generation wants to stop from a speed ahead of only 12 knots he must rotate his propeller full astern, and will need a mile and half for the maneuver.

Thirty thousand installed horsepower in a 1,200-foot tanker is the equivalent of 1/3 horsepower in a 40-foot boat—a ridiculous figure. "The primary response of the oil industry to this problem," Mandell tells us, "has been to improve masters' skills in handling these ships. . . ." In some cases they are trained with 40-foot self-propelled models equipped with fractional horsepower engines. To make things still more interesting, Mandell reveals that "the responses of a mammoth tanker to rudder signal or

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other disturbances are so slow that a human being cannot perceive them early enough to take corrective measures."

These oil-carrying monsters are an invitation to disaster. Any nation that allows them into its harbors is equally guilty with their builders and owners.

Damned If You Dam

The Aswan High Dam and power plant are now officially in operation. The system was dedicated ceremonially on January 15 by President Anwar el-Sadat of the United Arab Republic, and Nikolai V. Podgorny, the Soviet chief of state. It took ten years to build and cost about $1 billion. It might have been an American project rather than a Russian one, or a joint operation. Americans are excelled by no other nation in hydroelectric engineering: it was an American, Hugh Lincoln Cooper, who was in charge of the construction of the great water power and navigation project on the Dnieper River soon after the Russian Revolution. But John Foster Dulles canceled U.S. aid for the Aswan project in resentment against a Cairo-Moscow arms deal, whereupon the Soviets moved in with money and technicians—a loan of $554 million and 2,000 engineers, who directed 35,000 Egyptian laborers. Russian equipment moved rock and earth equal in bulk to seventeen Cheops pyramids, which will hold back a lake more than 300 miles long, containing three times as much water as Lake Mead, the Hoover Dam reservoir on the Colorado River. Even at partial capacity the twelve turbines are generating half of Egypt's electric power, and will—it is claimed—increase Egypt's arable land from 7 million to 9 million acres. Not least, it will regulate the flow of the Nile, which in dry seasons left the peasants to starve and at flood stage drove them from their farms.

But changing the face of nature on this scale, in a country with Egypt's climate and under African conditions generally, may bring undesirable results in its wake. The benefits are not a net gain. Fish species suitable for food when the river ran its own course may be supplanted by species inferior from a human standpoint, but biologically superior for the time being. Weeds sometimes grow to such an extent that eventually they threaten to clog the turbines. Part of the water impounded at such expense is lost by evaporation, seepage takes its toll, the underground water table is changed—raised in some places, lowered in others. According to one report, wells in an oasis 70 miles from Aswan have run dry.

Then there is the menace of water- and insect-borne disease. Some African man-made lakes have produced disastrous ecological effects. A lake several thousand square miles in area, with a shoreline containing innumerable bays and areas of quiet water, affords breeding places for malaria-bearing mosquitoes and snails and flies that carry some of the worst diseases that afflict mankind. There are projects in underdeveloped countries that have no use for the power, which have wasted resources which might have been put to good use in other ways.

These observations are applicable to much of science and technology, when overenthusiastically exported to underdeveloped nations by the overdeveloped. Doubts are accumulating on the wisdom of many of the projects that have been touted as the answer to the misery and starvation of much of the Third World. Experts point out that, lacking a resource base, science and technology are of little avail. Mechanized agriculture wrought prodigies of production in America because the machinery could be applied to first-rate agricultural lands, and because agricultural colleges and county agents taught farmers the requisite technology. The experts tell us that "there are no miracles" for the underdeveloped, but they are not always heard.

President Podgorny spoke one word of Arabic at the dedication of the Aswan Dam: "Mabrouk"—"congratulations." And indeed congratulations are in order: it is an enormous achievement. But, though John Foster Dulles may have cut off American participation for the wrong reasons, the problems of Egypt will not be solved by this one project, or others of the kind. In the ten years that it took to build the dam and power plant, Egypt has produced 10 million more mouths to feed. Such facts must be taken into account, whether Russians or Americans celebrate with the Egyptians a feat of engineering, however impressive.

They Take Care of Their Own

Augusta, Me.

University of Maine students at the Orono branch, not given to flag mutilation or ROTC riots, are facing their initial direct confrontation with the Establishment over what is believed to be a first on an American college campus—an abortion loan fund.

University security officials, directed by the local county attorney's office, are investigating whether the Population Control Fund, sponsored by the general student senate, is in violation of any law. The students have brought up their own big gun in the person of the knowledgeable former attorney for the city of Portland. Since their opening statements, both sides are maintaining prudent silence.

The loan fund, totaling $5,000, is made up of an assessment of 73¢ on each student's $12-a-year activities fee. Students are not obligated to contribute to the fund, but so far few have refused. Several coeds have already secured loans of up to $400 each to obtain abortions in New York, which has a new abortion-on-demand law. In Maine, doctors may perform abortions only if the mother's life is endangered.

George E. Chalmers of Philadelphia, president of the student senate, indicated that the idea grew out of a series of lectures presented by William R. Baird, leader of the Parents Aid Society of Hempstead, N.Y. Baird has since returned to Maine to drum up support for abortion reform being urged by a Roman Catholic woman legislator.

The fund was initiated in mid-December but was not reported until a month later. When the story broke, Gov. Kenneth M. Curtis, while advocating only limited reform in Maine's statutes, ventured his opinion that no laws were being broken by student participation in the fund. It was later revealed that the state's Health and Welfare Department financed New York abortions for some of its clients. It would hardly seem consistent to find any wrongdoing on the part of the students when the state uses public funds for the same purpose. EVELYN SCRIBNER

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THE POISONOUS TREE

ARL COHEN
Ir. Cohen teaches philosophy at the University of Michigan, nn Arbor. He is the author of two books soon to be pubshed: Democracy *(University of Georgia Press) and* Civil isobedience *(Columbia University Press).*

ecret, electronic surveillance of private citizens, by govrnment agencies, is a serious invasion of privacy, and oes irremediable damage to the decency of our civic fe. How can it be stopped? One legal weapon against it, hich can have important effect, is the refusal of the ourts to use or to receive evidence in this unavory way. Over the retention and strengthening of that eapon legal battle now rages.

Some background first. The Fourth Amendment of ie U.S. Constitution lays it down that:

> The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.

)n this basis it is a long-standing principle of our courts hat the government may not build its case against a efendant in a criminal action upon evidence obtained y unconstitutional methods. Even where that evidence, vere it to be accepted, might clearly establish guilt, it nust not be accepted, or even heard, because permitting ny use of it is direct encouragement to law enforcers o gather such evidence in future cases. In applying this mportant exclusionary principle to search by wire tap, he U.S. Supreme Court also held in 1969 (*Alderman v. United States*) that the government must disclose to defendant any record of conversations he participated n, or which occurred on his premises, which the governnent acquired by means of any illegal electronic surveilance. (The practical importance of this ruling appears n the current Plamondon case, cited below.)

But when is electronic surveillance legal and when llegal? The Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, far less restrictive in this regard than it ought o be, does lay down strict conditions within which elecronic surveillance may be carried out. Probable cause to elieve that criminal activity is in progress must be sworn o before surveillance is undertaken, and a duly constituted ourt or magistrate must authorize specific surveillance nd issue a warrant therefor. Unauthorized electronic urveillance by government officials is a serious crime. But the Act also provides, unhappily, for exceptions to its own restrictions. By its own words the Act does not

> limit the constitutional power of the President to take such measures as he deems necessary to protect the Nation against actual or potential attack or other hostile acts of a foreign power, or to obtain foreign intelligence information deemed essential to the security of the United States, or to protect national security information against foreign intelligence activities. Nor shall anything contained in this chapter be deemed to limit the constitutional power of the President to take such measures as he deems necessary to protect the United States against the overthrow of the Government by force or other unlawful means, or against any other clear and present danger to the structure or existence of the Government. . . .

Through this hole in the dike the Attorney General of the United States and his subordinates have surged, and the federal courts now face the difficult problem of restraining the zeal of law enforcers eager to tap the wires of anyone who might, by their lights, be deemed a threat to "national security." The threat, more deeply understood, is *from* the government—and the privacy of citizens is its victim.

The rub lies here. Who decides what is necessary for "national security"? The President, acting through the Attorney General, is authorized to conduct electronic surveillance without judicial warrant to protect the nation against the hostile acts of foreign powers. That is itself worrisome. But is the exception to be enlarged? Is wire tapping to be permitted, and its results received by the courts, in matters of alleged *internal* security?

The issue is not only theoretical. A case now before the U.S. District Court, Eastern District of Michigan, presents the practical problem starkly. The defendants are charged with conspiring to injure government property, and one of them, Lawrence "Pun" Plamondon, is charged with the actual bombing of a CIA office building in Ann Arbor. The trial is about to begin. Electronic surveillance of Mr. Plamondon's conversations has been conducted by the government, undertaken admittedly *without* the judicial authorization that the law requires. The sealed logs of these wire taps have been delivered to the court, and with them an affidavit from the Attorney General. This affidavit does not assert that at the time these wire taps were installed, law-enforcement agents had probable cause to believe that criminal activity was actually being plotted. (If such probable cause could have been shown —that, for example, the illegal overthrow of the government by violence was being planned—a proper warrant could surely have been obtained.) The affidavit argues, badly, that the Attorney General, as agent of the President, *may by himself authorize* electronic surveillance of "attempts of domestic organizations to attack and subvert the existing structure of the government." Therefore, he concludes, wire tapping in this case, although without judicial warrant or control, is yet legal.

It is to the enduring credit of the U.S. District Court, in the person of Judge Damon J. Keith, that this argument by the government has been flatly rejected. Keith's forceful and distinguished opinion, handed down on January 25, affirms the constitutional right of citizens to be protected from such unauthorized electronic searches. He makes

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it clear that dissident domestic organizations may *not* be treated like unfriendly foreign powers. Such an analogy, he points out

> strikes at the very constitutional privileges and immunities that are inherent in United States citizenship. It is to be remembered that in our democracy all men are to receive equal and exact justice regardless of their political beliefs or persuasions. The Executive branch of our Government cannot be given the power or the opportunity to investigate and prosecute criminal violations under two different standards simply because an accused espouses views which are inconsistent with our present form of Government.

Judge Keith adds his support to the well-reasoned argument of federal Judge Warren J. Ferguson (*U.S.* v. *Smith*, California, Central District, January 8) who ruled: ". . . in wholly domestic situations there is no national security exemption from the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment." If, therefore, in cases like this, the government conducts electronic surveillance without judicial warrant, all that it collects is collected in clear violation of the Fourth Amendment. Judge Keith and Judge Ferguson renew our confidence in the federal judiciary.

Having rejected the government's argument, what is to be done? Evidence got by wire tap is to be excluded, assuredly; but that is not by itself enough. Suppose, through the use of illegal wire taps, the government gets leads to further evidence about which it otherwise could not have known. That too in accord with an old Supreme Court ruling (*Silverthorn Lumber Co.* v. *U.S.*, 1920) must be wholly barred, as the "fruit of the poisonous tree." And how are defendants to be sure that all such illegitimate evidence is excluded unless they know the nature of the poison? Only by having *themselves* the right to examine the materials improperly acquired; in this way alone can they adequately protect themselves. Judge Keith therefore grants the pretrial motion of attorney William Kunstler: "This court hereby orders that the government make full disclosure to defendant Plamondon of his monitored conversations." Yet more. Government prosecutors must learn that by so conducting themselves they are not merely ineffective but also risk the security of an otherwise solid case. He concludes: "The court, in the exercise of its discretion, further orders that an evidentiary hearing to determine the existence of taint either in the indictment or in the evidence introduced at trial be conducted at the conclusion of the trial of this matter." Judge Keith courageously puts the Attorney General in his place.

This ruling, clearly designed to protect the privacy of all citizens, will be appealed by the government, to the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals in Cincinnati. The Michigan trial was delayed to early February, with the hope that a speedy review of this matter will be undertaken. Upon the outcome of that review, and probably its ultimate re-examination by the Supreme Court, rests much of the security of American citizens in their private lives. □

CALIFORNIA BUBBLE

AEROSPACE IN CRISIS

MARTIN GELLEN

Mr. Gellen, on the staff of the Bay Area Institute, is completing a book on the effect of American foreign policy on the social and economic development of California.

San Francisco

The current recession in the American economy has hit California very hard. While the national unemployment rate has reached 5.5 per cent, the highest point in more than six years, California unemployment has soared to 7.2 per cent, the highest level in a decade. All of Southern California and the San Jose metropolitan area in Northern California are now on the Department of Labor list of "substantial" unemployment regions—areas with rates of joblessness between 6 and 8.9 per cent. The coastal urban areas have dominated the downswing because they house most of California's military-dependent aerospace industry. According to state government statistics, aerospace is responsible for about two-thirds of all the workers who have recently joined the ranks of California's unemployed.

Since 1967, employment in aerospace has fallen from an all-time high of 616,000 workers to around 484,000, and is expected to drop in 1971 down to an annual average of about 450,000. This will amount to an overall decline of about 27 per cent, the sharpest slump which has struck California war industries since the demobilization following World War II. This contraction has its roots in the cutbacks by the Department of Defense and National Aeronautics and Space Administration which began in 1968. Since that time, prime contracts awarded to California have dropped from $8.3 billion to $6.5 billion. If one includes cutbacks scheduled for the remainder of this fiscal year, then the total decline will be in the neighborhood of $2.1 billion.

The national press has focused on the unemployed engineer and scientist as symbols of the aerospace depression. But the fact is that production-line workers comprise more than half the layoffs so far, while engineers and scientists have accounted for only 25 per cent. This figure, however, does represent a high rate of layoffs for technical personnel. Previous slumps have rarely affected these workers, but with the growth of sophistication in weapons systems, the number of scientists and engineers employed in the aerospace industries has increased considerably. The traditional ratio between white-collar and blue-collar workers has been so altered that for the first time highly skilled technical workers are being laid off on a large scale. Combined with the fact that large numbers of engineers

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

and physicists, fresh out of college, are finding it almost impossible to find work, a sizable portion of the technical work force is being "proletarianized."

Since aerospace employment accounts for about two-fifths of all manufacturing employment in the state, the layoffs are bound to disrupt the stability of California's economy. Military and space spending created more than a million jobs in California during the cold war. The incomes of these workers support additional demand for goods and services, thereby generating further jobs; economists estimate that about 30 per cent of total employment in California is dependent in one way or another upon the flow of space and military dollars into the state.

It is not surprising, then, that the aerospace slump is spreading to other sectors of the state's economy. Steel shipments from West Coast mills have fallen by more than 20 per cent. The rate of increase in service and office jobs has slowed by 80 per cent. In the consumer enclaves of Orange and Santa Clara Counties, where aerospace layoffs have been especially severe, job growth has almost stopped. Finally, the slump has produced a shrinkage in tax revenues of such proportions that Governor Reagan has predicted a $150 million deficit in the state budget for this year and a $712 million deficit for the next. In response, Reagan has cut welfare, health and education programs. This austerity crusade will put the squeeze on California's poor, throw thousands of elderly people out of nursing homes, and reduce teacher recruitment at a time when classes are large and getting larger.

The only explanation that the Republican Administrations in Sacramento and Washington can offer for this sharpest of all post-World War II recessions in California is that the United States is moving from a "wartime" to a "peacetime" economy. In a speech delivered at the San Antonio Chamber of Commerce on October 9, Secretary of Defense Laird proclaimed that "resources formerly channeled into war have been freed for the solution of domestic problems and for other peacetime purposes; and we are today well along the path of the transition from a wartime to a peacetime economy. The budget which President Nixon presented to Congress last February," Laird continued, "marked a historic change in our national priorities. In the current fiscal year, for the first time in twenty-one years, defense spending is no longer the biggest category of federal spending. This year, more of the federal budget is devoted to human resource programs than to national security and to defense. . . . This year for the first time in twenty-one years, defense spending is less than 40 per cent of the total federal budget."

When asked several days later by a reporter about the rise in unemployment in defense industries on the West Coast, Laird replied with a rueful smile, "Well, that is what happens when you move so rapidly from a wartime to a peacetime economy."

But the United States is by no means converting to a peacetime economy. In reality, it is embarking on a reform of the permanent war economy. For California the transition so far has not been pleasant. The only way to estimate what these reforms will mean in the next decade is to examine the new "national priorities" of the Nixon Administration.

First, it is not true that the 1971 budget shows a decline in military spending to less than 40 per cent of all federal outlays. What the budget does indicate is the growth of federal trust funds for self-supporting programs such as Social Security, Medicare and unemployment insurance. Since 1969, these have been lumped together with other federal moneys in an all-inclusive device known as the "unified budget." At least 80 per cent of the increase in outlays for "human resources" which the Nixon Administration claims as a "peace dividend" represents expenditures from these trust funds. The billions in question do not come from federal income tax collections and are not spent at the discretion of the federal government.

Subtract the trust fund outlays from the federal budget,

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and it is clear that there has been no change in our national priorities. Approximately 50 per cent of all expenditures are for national security and space programs, and only 21 per cent for social programs. This includes 3 per cent for education, 5 per cent for health programs, and about 2 per cent for housing and community development. Moreover, cuts in health, education and welfare expenditures have been made, and nothing significant in the way of new programs has been *added,* with the possible exception of the 1,000 new FBI agents assigned to keep tabs on radicals.

Ever since the political crisis over the Cambodian invasion and the liberal resurgence it produced across the land, the Nixon Administration has spoken of "new priorities" and "peace." It has consistently used this language in an effort to convince the American people that increased unemployment is socially and politically desirable. However, what the current rise in unemployment really reflects is not an end to the war but its continuation. The cutbacks and layoffs began during early 1968 when the enormous costs of our military adventure in Indochina forced the government to shift more and more spending into the war, not only from domestic programs but also from military programs unrelated to Vietnam. The only way the United States could continue fighting in Southeast Asia without drastically fueling inflation was to put a brake on government spending in other areas. For this reason Washington decided to reduce aerospace projects —the space program, missile development and production, and aircraft procurement.

In California, war costs had already slowed the growth of aerospace sales. Only 18 per cent of the increase in military dollars allocated to California between 1965 and 1968 went to the aerospace industry. A good part of this 18 per cent increase represented orders for aircraft and communications equipment required by military operations in Southeast Asia; by 1968 most of these orders had been filled. Thus when the cutbacks started and Vietnam procurement dropped too, aerospace was in serious trouble.

At the same time, the failure of the United States in Vietnam has led to a re-evaluation of military policy and a redeployment of American forces throughout the world. The government wants a war machine that can deal with another Vietnam, without enormous bursts of government spending, while keeping the Russians and Chinese at bay with bigger and better missiles and space shots. In short, the United States wants to spend each military-space dollar so that it will buy more war, and more effective war, than before.

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These goals are now being pursued in the shift to a vo unteer army, the emergence of electronic warfare, tl beginnings of automation in naval operations, and tl development of a fast deployment capability with the hel of C-5As, Navy Fast Deployment Logistic Ships, ar "packaged bases." The new policy will also mean can paigns for higher productivity in war industries and r form of procurement for weapons systems.

Especially significant for California in this reorganiz tion is the prospect of relative contraction in the aerospac industries *despite* rising military expenditures generall Increased labor costs due to inflation are one cause fc this; the number of jobs created by spending $1 billio for war has fallen markedly over the past decade. I 1960, it was about 88,000; today it is down near 68,00(This trend will continue during the seventies, since labc costs will remain high and the capital input for weapon production is sure to rise. The predicted growth in militar spending will bolster profits but probably not increas employment. Large increases in government outlays, a occurred over the past five years, could possibly improv the employment situation in aerospace; but at this poin the strong inflationary tendencies in the economy prohibi such outright pump priming.

In California, the dilemma is sharpened by th problem of runaway shops in the electronics industry. Th steep price of labor is beginning to force many companie to move their commercial plants out of high-wage area like Santa Clara and Los Angeles Counties and into re gions of cheap labor like Taiwan, South Korea and Hon Kong. So, while the military dollar will be generating rela tively fewer jobs, there will be considerably more slack i employment for it to take up.

For California this spells stagnation. The state's spec tacular growth since World War II has stemmed in larg part from the expansion of the aerospace industry anc mounting military space budgets. Between 1949 and 195 employment in aerospace increased by 228 per cent, com pared to a rise of only 81 per cent in the rest of the state' economy. From 1953 to 1963 military spending rose 5 per cent in California, while population growth trailec slightly behind with an increase of about 50 per cent. The aerospace industry contributed 330,000 jobs to the Cali fornia economy during the fifties, and about 100,000 new jobs in the sixties. For the seventies, however, it will provide only about 40,000 new jobs above present low levels

As a consequence, California may experience considerably more pronounced economic fluctuations in the future. Large-scale military spending is one of the primary means through which government can soften the downturns and sharpen the upturns in the business cycle. Fat military budgets made the recession of the 1950s and 1960s considerably milder in California than in the rest of the United States. But with a low rate of expansion for the aerospace industries during the seventies, it is more likely that the present recession will be the model for the future with the local slumps more severe in comparison with the rest of the country.

Indeed, there is reason to believe that with the 1970 depression in aerospace, the California economy has entered a new historical phase. Gone is a good deal of the

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optimism and self-satisfaction which accompanied California's long postwar boom. Western business leaders are more reserved about the future, if not openly doubtful. A report by Wells Fargo called "The Decade Ahead" describes the seventies as a period of moderate expansion with "social and economic problems" which will "challenge" the will and resources of the state. The Bank of America, in a similar report, places even greater emphasis on the problems confronting the state.

The bursting of the golden bubble of California's cold-war prosperity may, however, turn out to be a blessing. A movement for the economic conversion of the state's aerospace industries is just beginning to emerge, and it may grow quite rapidly as stagnation becomes more and more evident during the next few years. In addition, Californians will find it harder in the future to separate local problems from international issues. This may well provide a basis from which anti-war, anti-poverty and other opposition movements in the state could unite in common struggle. While California's business community is hesitant about the seventies, the decade may produce constructive, fundamental change. □

THE REMAKING OF MUSKIE

J. F. RICHARD

Mr. Richard resigned from the State Department last year after a tour of duty in South Vietnam. He has written previously on Presidential politics and foreign affairs.

On election eve last fall, a new personality emerged on television and gravely intoned the classic "My fellow Americans . . ." Responding to President Nixon's previous emphasis on law and order, the lanky figure, with long brown hair and steely blue eyes, who sought a more appropriate meaning to the "Social Issue," evoked memories of a more hopeful past. Even the very words seemed to echo from a bygone era: "We must deal with symptoms [of crime], but we must also look for the deeper causes in the structure of society." The words came from the pens of two former Kennedy speech writers, but the face was that of Sen. Edmund Sixtus Muskie. With this one very successful performance, the junior Senator from Maine was propelled to national prominence, perhaps to become the Presidential nominee in 1972. The way in which it came about—the role of the media and the party professionals in this remarkable rise to power—invites scrutiny.

Many will recall how Muskie was plucked from obscurity to defend the strong Vietnamese plank at the 1968 Democratic Convention, and how he became the Vice Presidential candidate after Republican Nelson Rockefeller turned it down. But of course the Democratic ticket was defeated. After that the Maine politician seemed to retreat into the shadows of the Senate whence he came. He continued to take well-calculated positions on the issues before Congress, even became one of the leaders of non-controversial environmental legislation, but he let others lead in the areas of drugs, welfare and foreign policy. He seemed to shy away from an activist political role.

In fact, it was immediately after Nixon's inauguration that Muskie began his slowly developing Presidential bid, but only recently, since his election eve coup, has he received any attention. In a rather poorly coordinated effort to stay in the public eye after the defeat of 1968, he worked his way around the speaking circuit. He soon realized that these appeals to local civic groups would not add up to a national mandate. Sen. Edward Kennedy's name and his promotion to Democratic Whip were not only getting the headlines but the popular support. That spring, Muskie conceded, "When everybody begins this early saying, 'It's going to be Teddy,' why, it's going to be Teddy; almost sure to be."

Then came the Chappaquiddick tragedy. Democrats started turning to Muskie for leadership, but the Senator temporized. Well aware of the proverbial Kennedy resilience, he did not want to get burned twice. Finally, at the end of the year, urged on by several former Kennedy aides, especially Averell Harriman, Clark Clifford and Cyrus Vance, he began again.

This time it was to be a truly professional job. With the help of several Washington lawyers and Arnold Picker of United Artists, he set up a $250,000 command center in downtown Washington. In addition to the normal tasks of research, planning and fund raising, they began work on two books for Muskie's authorship, one on environment and the other on his political philosophy. As the treasury grew toward the $1 million mark, mainly from Wall Street, other staff was added—a television consultant, a film producer, an advertising agency, a pollster.

A special seminar was loosely organized to include such former Kennedy powerhouses as once Assistant Secretary of Defense Paul Warneke, Asst. Atty. Gen. Fred Vinson, economic advisers Walter Heller and Arthur Okun, and former White House aide Harry McPherson. The diagnosis of his advisers was that the Senator was "responsive, receptive and willing to learn," but reluctant to commit himself until all points of view were reconciled. A cautious New England politician of some twenty years' experience, Muskie was strongest on conservation. Even here, Ralph Nader's criticism of his unwillingness to attack the big industrial polluters had to be met later by his support of a "clean car" by 1975.

The public unveiling came last March before the National Press Club. The revelation of increased allied military involvement in Laos and Cambodia had provoked a bipartisan Congressional uproar, including a plank from the Democratic Policy Committee demanding withdrawal by 1971. Senator Muskie finally came out with his first major statement against the war. Characterizing Vietnamization as "unworkable," he asked for a more flexible atti-

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tude toward the Paris negotiations and the Nguyen Van Thieu government. Though his Senate position remained more circumspect and only months later did he endorse the withdrawal deadline, his position was on record. The opening round of the new campaign phase of issue-oriented speeches to key audiences was successful. The well-tutored politician was meeting the pressure he described "to speak out more visibly and audibly."

Two weeks later, he addressed the AFL-CIO leadership. Skirting the specific issue of import quotas, Muskie favored trade expansion with "more concern about the victims of rising imports." After another two weeks, he spoke to the National Catholic Educational Association. Again avoiding the topic of bussing for school integration, he backed social responsibility in educational policy.

Still not as aggressive as some of his Kennedy advisers hoped, the cool New Englander was nevertheless getting exposure on the national issues. His poll ratings were going up, and some of the party pros were making commitments. Richard Goodwin, the Kennedy idea man, moved his family to Maine. Massachusetts Democratic leader Lester Hyman began tapping his financial resources, apparently with Kennedy's explicit approval. Some of Lyndon Johnson's old cohorts, Bill Moyers and Jack Valenti, began showing up at strategy sessions. The tactics shifted, taking on a more directly political cast.

While the whole country was shuddering at the spectacles of Cambodia, Kent State, Augusta and Jackson State, Muskie chartered a plane to take about sixty associates to a black student's funeral in Mississippi. That Kennedy-like move was certainly noticed by the most politically cohesive ethnic bloc in America. Muskie also began planning his trip to Israel. The articulate Senator's speeches moved away from the substantive issues toward the catchwords—declining income, higher interest rates, decency, moderation and the "Whole Society." His audiences also changed from the special-interest group to financial contributors and the public rally. During the peak of last year's midterm elections, Muskie endorsed some twenty-six candidates across the country. Senate Leader Mike Mansfield remarked sympathetically, "He's got to keep running like the Kennedys do."

It was in this context that Muskie received the invitation to speak for the Democratic Party opposite the President on election eve. But the choice of Muskie ignored the fact that Senator Mansfield had also criticized Muskie for his lack of "charisma and charm." A reporter traveling with Muskie found him "unable to generate the kind of excitement which normally surrounds a Presidential contender." On at least one occasion, addressing a largely Jewish audience, Muskie failed to mention the Mideast crisis. Indeed, until the telecast, he consistently refused to condemn the Agnew tactics or even to mention the Republicans.

In evaluating the strength of Muskie's campaign, it is also interesting that none of his endorsements fell on candidates south of the Mason-Dixon line, except for the defeated Sen. Joseph Tydings. At a press conference in Texas, he refused to comment on that state's races. Even in New York and in New England, except for his home state, none of his endorsees won. Muskie was chosen as party spokesman despite the fact that several other Democrats, including Senators Bayh, Hughes and McGovern, had full-blown campaigns under way. Indeed, McGovern had counterattacked Agnew, had helped more Democrats with endorsements and money, and had drawn considerably more publicity than Muskie.

Most important, the choice of Muskie as party spokesman ignored the Senator's other side. Just three days before his famous telecast, he had returned to the small city of Bath, Maine, to wind up his Senate re-election campaign. About fifty of this staunchest supporters had turned out for the evening rally. The tall, dignified Senator arrived at the small shipworkers' hall an hour late from dinner, amid much oohing and aahing. With only a moment's pause to greet the humble senior citizens, Muskie quickly sequestered himself in a back room. The bolder of his admirers followed, but even they were too shy to speak. They stood in a circle around the candidate, silent and tongue-tied.

Finally someone asked about Agnew. The imperious Senator sternly refused to dignify the Vice President's statements with a reply. About responsible government and dissent Muskie said nothing. The silence became embarrassing. To relieve the tension, I asked if he would explain the seeming contradiction of his Maine position in favor of textile and shoe quotas but against oil quotas. Apparently seeing the question as a challenge to his authority, he was visibly annoyed. With a barrage of statistics, he dryly stated that some quotas increase production while others discourage it. True for Maine perhaps, but Muskie ignored the wider implications for trade policy. Once more, the conversation died.

At last, to almost everyone's relief, the reserved candidate moved into the next room to give his speech. Introduced as "the next President of the United States," Muskie began with a thorough but rather lofty exposition on the economy. Since he made no reference to the local problem of defense contracting, attention quickly waned. Muskie worked his way around the Agnew question to his favorite theme—his experience within the American tradition of trust, decency and tolerance. Basic to that tradition, he said, is communication between candidate and voter. It is hard to get people to attend rallies, he admitted. "I've campaigned in more states than any other national figure," he told his stunned local supporters; "I wish I could go back to 1954 when television was a novelty and we got fifteen minutes for $125 and held a captive audience." Attention picked up temporarily when he recommended higher taxes.

When he asked for questions, no one made a sound. The tired troops started leaving. In the sudden calm, the disappointed Senator tried to shake a few hands. Finally, one shy but determined Maine hunter asked Muskie about his vote in favor of gun control. Rather than calmly discussing the issue, Muskie loudly berated his constituent for his ignorance of the proposal. "I am *not* for confiscation," he shouted as a few lingerers gathered. He demanded if the nervously twitching sportsman liked the idea of such "criminals" as black radical Angela Davis' buying guns to kill. Someone, trying to restore calm, asked the Senator if he favored the registration of guns. He angrily retorted, "Maybe, but that's not in the bill either."

In many ways, the evening was typical. Aloof and dis-

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tant, Muskie seemed to find it difficult to relate, communicate, or relax, even with his own people. As one reporter suggested, "Muskie's trouble is that he is essentially an introvert running for an extrovert's job." Though thoughtful about ideas and humanity, he seemed unable to get involved with flesh-and-blood people. At a biennial Democratic breakfast the next morning, he was again late and again the only speaker who failed to mention the party, the local candidates and the campaign workers. During a street rally that afternoon, his discomfort with the handshakers and signature seekers was obvious. For one who believes that "elections are decided on personalities, not issues," this reserve may be a real handicap.

Muskie's Bath performance was also symptomatic in his avoidance of the issues. Early in his re-election campaign, the Senator promised that he would speak out, "not only to Maine but to the rest of the country." In May, at the State Democratic Convention, he did speak out, on Vietnam and Cambodia. Under heavy pressure from his supporters, he abandoned his prepared text on law and order and came forth with an eloquently stated nine-point peace plan. After the enthusiastic reception had cooled, however, all record of the proposal disappeared. It became the mysteriously "lost" speech. The rest of the campaign was unusually noncommittal.

Of course he had his position papers. He supported national health insurance, but shied away from universal coverage. A Catholic himself, he favored family planning but opposed any meaningful tax incentives. He went along with military cuts, but opposed a volunteer army. He backed the idea of more and better paid police, but played down the idea of court and penal reform. However, as the campaign went on, he more and more used his theme of trust and the American tradition of decency to evade the issues. At one point, he astonished his fellow Democrats by praising Nixon's first nineteen months in office as a "remarkably shrewd political performance."

The high point of Muskie's state campaign was a formal dinner for Maine's 500 leading citizens. The keynote was a half-hour film biography which avoided all issues. It set the tone for the rest of the campaign, which revolved around his personality as a long-time state representative and a possible future President.

In the last days before the election, I asked the Senator privately what were the priority issues in the state and the nation. He brushed the question aside, saying, "That's the job of you members of the press." His top staff, however, was openly apologetic about the lack of issues. They explained it by pointing to the tremendous anti-Muskie backlash which followed his plane trip to Mississippi. Maine, they insisted, wanted a noncontroversial, home-town representative. Though this explanation did not quite fit with Muskie's introduction as the next President who "campaigned in more states than any other national figure," there was a delicate balance between his state and national aspirations. He remained more a state than a national candidate. One cannot help but suspect that, if Muskie had been more frank, openly stating his opinions on the issues and appealing to Maine's local pride as the home of a national leader, he might have done better even in his own state. Certainly he would have had more of a foundation for his Presidential ambitions.

Muskie's aides also rationalized the lack of issues by pointing out the lack of a strong opponent. Republican nominee Neil Bishop was a rabid rightist, a 66-year-old ex-dairy farmer who had lost his two previous election bids. Faced by the best-organized campaign machine in Maine history, outspent more than 6 to 1, he never had a chance. As Muskie's campaign manager described Bishop, "He wouldn't know an issue if it hit him over the head." Clearly he was not a man to force debate.

However, a statement on the issues need not have come from the forum of debate. Indeed, the very lack of competition gave the 56-year-old Muskie more room to speak out freely. And if debate was the desired medium there was an abundance of sparring partners from Nixon right on down. The fact remains that there was a leadership vacuum on the Democratic side and Muskie failed to fill it until television and the party technicians pushed him on to center stage.

Muskie's behavior at Bath also pointed up a third characteristic, his self-conscious rejection of the cloak of glamour. To him, charisma means jumping up and down with nostrils flaring. Despite the tutoring of the Kennedy clan, it does not fit his character. Gaudiness does not appeal to his taste. He went a step further, saying, "The public is tired of all the strident, hot politicians."

Webster defines charisma as "a special quality of leadership that captures the popular imagination." When John F. Kennedy said in his inaugural, "Ask not what your country can do for you, but what you can do for your country," his appeal went beyond the bobby-soxers and the press. In the face of the tremendous challenges to America, perhaps we need that rare quality which can enable us to transcend petty differences. Charisma does not and should not belong to the wild extremists of Left or Right. And pragmatically, it may be the only way for the "outs" to defeat an incumbent President.

Muskie occasionally verges on charisma, but then he seems deliberately to step back. His volunteers still remember bitterly his early speech on Vietnam and its disappearance. When he spoke to a fund-raising dinner in New York, just a week before his telecast, Muskie's dreary performance provoked one disillusioned guest to label him "a New England Arthur Goldberg." At one time, he was quoted as saying matter of factly: "The only way to deal with the grievances of any group is to put together minorities with common interests until you create a majority." It was for such reasons that his home-town supporters quickly filed out to go home, most of them willing to vote for their incumbent Senator, but nevertheless disappointed in their hope for something more.

Muskie felt that his unwillingness to strike dramatic poses was the cause of his relatively poor press coverage. He was right up to a point, but it was not that simple. As suggested by his response to my questions at Bath, Muskie was deeply suspicious of the press. Unlike the Kennedys, he seems more aware of the possibility of a slip than of the possibility of genuine communication with the public. He reads the press attentively, but does not seek it out. To him, the media are abstract institutions beyond his influence. He is even more unbending with reporters than he is with the people. Perhaps that is why

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the problem of reaching the voter is so constantly on his mind. His attitude has not hurt him in the unique brand of politics prevailing in Maine, but in national politics, where the voter is so much more remote, Muskie may be operating under a serious and unnecessary liability.

In sum, the Bath performance revealed a very different, unpublicized Muskie. Articulate and attractive, he was nonetheless remarkably aloof from the people and the press, and unusually unwilling to enlighten the issues with flair and zest. The next evening was no different. Again late, again introduced as the "next President," he forgot to touch on the local issue of textiles or refer to the local candidates. Once more he stressed his experience and the American tradition of trust and tolerance. For his largely French Canadian audience, he reminisced about how his father had come to this country from Poland at the age of 17, seeking a new life. "There is no real generation gap," he insisted, though his son, a photographer clad in leather jacket and jeans, stood out among the conservative onlookers. Muskie left immediately after his speech.

Later, two of his aides came up to me privately and apologized for the lack of issues, excitement and volunteers. "We began with great emotion when the students forced the May convention to adopt a strong anti-Vietnam plank. Muskie's speech then had people weeping. But it's been downhill ever since. The end of the campaign kind of fizzled."

The fact remained that, earlier that afternoon, Muskie had been invited by the Democratic National Committee to speak on national television in rebuttal to the President. We were all sitting down to a leisurely lunch on the road, idly chatting about the problems of the campaign, particularly the use of television. Muskie's campaign manager came over, secretively told him of the invitation, and quickly introduced him to Milton Gwirtzman, one of Kennedy's former speech writers.

They huddled in a discussion of how to handle the rebuttal. Only the evening before, Muskie had made a tape for local television, coming down very hard for law and order: "Now is the time for moderate Americans . . . to come to the aid of their country, to stand up and be counted, in opposition to those who engage in violent demonstrations and to those who violate basic standards of decency and morality in their political conduct." Clearly the national speech against Nixon would have to be very different.

The people were able to see the results on election eve. But many, tired of the political game by then, did not watch the Nixon-Muskie TV showdown. Judging from the reactions of those who did, few were surprised when the President labeled his critics hypocritical hoodlums, pretending to be romantics but really ordinary thugs. Incidentally paralleling Muskie's earlier "stand up and be counted," Nixon's statement that it was every citizen's duty to stop the rock throwers and obscenity shouters seemed as American as the vigilantes of the old West and brought roars of approval from his Phoenix audience.

What was shocking was that the past master of television deigned to be seen in black and white with a nearly inaudible sound track. Thousands of viewers telephoned their local stations to voice their complaints. Finally, the White House had to explain that, warned of the problem, it had insisted that the tape be run anyway.

Drawing by Nadel

Equally surprising was the fact that the President was answered, in color, by the very audible voice of a new Muskie. Speaking from a specially rebuilt easy chair at the quiet fireside of a borrowed ocean-front home, all well designed to contrast with the raucous Phoenix auditorium of the ubiquitous, arm-waving Nixon, the Senator began: "There is no issue of law and order . . . only a [common] problem." Invoking the memory of every Democratic President since Roosevelt, he insisted that his party too was for "sweeping legislation" to end crime. But more than just stopping the symptoms of violence, he vowed to attack the deeper social causes, the ghettos, the environment and the war.

Shifting to the economy, the new Muskie vigorously attacked Nixon's policies, which fell hardest on "the workingman, the consumer, the middle-class American." He condemned the cutbacks in health and education. After a brief homily on the peace and serenity of Maine, he wound up with a plea for the "politics of trust" as against the Republican "politics of fear."

The entire performance was masterly, particularly against the backdrop obligingly provided by Nixon. The picture was of calm, dignified reasonableness. Without "jumping up and down," he managed to appeal to every conceivable political faction: the Roosevelt coalition, the

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LBJ fans, the Kennedy clique, the hard-hats, the aged, the students, the critics of our presence in Vietnam, environmentalists, integrationists, everyone. Muskie on camera was the very antithesis of his usual self. He managed to be, simultaneously, the warm, humble public servant, the strong, issue-oriented party leader, and the charismatic television figure. Altogether, it was an unbelievable transformation from the Muskie in Maine of three days before. Elements of the off-stage Muskie were there—the "no issue," "sweeping legislation" and "trust"—but they were well disguised.

The obvious question was how Muskie had managed the instant metamorphosis from cautious Maine politician to national Democratic leader. In part, paradoxically, Nixon was responsible. Remembering his defeats in 1960 and 1962 and well aware that he was the first President since 1848 not to bring in a Congress of his own party, Nixon was a politically insecure man. When he saw that most of the contested Senate seats belonged to Democrats elected in the "freak" elections of 1958 and 1964, Democrats whose party was now more deep in debt and divided over crime, race and Vietnam, his instinctive reaction was to jump into the fray. With the White House fully involved in picking candidates, raising money and, at the end, directly campaigning with unprecedented fervor, most of the Democrats, lacking a leader, felt compelled to come around to a tough stand on law and order. A few—Senator McGovern, Larry O'Brien, and Speaker McCormack—resisted, but their words were lost in the whirlwind. Finally, the heavy intervention of Nixon in the midterm scraps forced the Democrats to break precedent also, and pick a single-party spokesman two years before their convention.

A portion of the responsibility for the election eve speech lay with the media, the very media Muskie so thoroughly mistrusted. After the possibly provoked San Jose riots, the Republican National Committee decided to mobilize the sympathy vote by nationally broadcasting Nixon's answer in Anaheim. CBS offered the Democrats equal time. With $9.3 million in debts already outstanding, they declined. As Muskie himself had said only a few days before, most campaign financiers, like politicians, are personally conservative. They do not want to commit themselves to a candidate two years in advance, especially in a recession year.

However, when Nixon again hired half an hour, for a rebroadcast of his even tougher Phoenix speech, the three major networks got together and offered the Democratic National Committee equal time, on credit. The committee accepted fifteen minutes on the new terms. The Republican time was cut in half, permitting only excerpts of Nixon's speech. Thus television, so scorned by Muskie before, opened the opportunity for the coup.

But most of the responsibility remained with the party professionals. Since the Democratic Committee originally arranged for the time, the logical choice for speaker was National Chairman Larry O'Brien. That would have avoided the difficulty of choosing one of the many Democratic Presidential contenders. O'Brien's committee and associates prevailed against him, however, arguing that he was too much involved in internal party matters, particularly money raising, to have credibility as a national spokesman. O'Brien suggested his old friend, Teddy Kennedy, but he turned it down; the death of Mary Jo Kopechne was still too much with him to allow any such bold move, at least until after his re-election to the Senate.

Kennedy recommended Muskie. Despite the Senator's lingering drawbacks—his cold reserve and frequent equivocation on key issues—he was a good speaker and had the stature of a former Vice Presidential nominee. Perhaps more important, he was surrounded by former Kennedy advisers. The word from Goodwin in Maine was that Ed Muskie was "not locked in on the issues and could be influenced by whoever was around him."

Apparently the Kennedy forces felt they could remake Muskie in their own image, either as a stalking-horse or as a final candidate. The speech itself seemed to confirm their judgment. O'Brien seconded the Kennedy choice and brought the National Committee along. Using the argument that it was Muskie or nobody, they persuaded some of the disillusioned "Young Turks" to cooperate. Curiously, the two of them least likely to support Muskie's record, a Ralph Nader associate and the head of the Vietnam Moratorium Committee, were used to convince Averell Harriman that he should underwrite the broadcast. The aging diplomat had said earlier, "I am an old man, and I don't want to die with Richard Nixon in the White House." He was so pleased that the young idealists were getting back into practical politics that he volunteered to sponsor the whole enterprise on the spot. Finally Muskie was asked by telephone; he agreed, and the coup became a reality.

Quickly the participants had to cover their tracks. The fact that the role of answering the President on election eve gave Muskie an enormous lead toward the nomination in 1972 presented certain complications. With several serious candidates in the field, the official party structure is, by tradition, supposed to remain neutral until an open-party convention can nominate. When Nixon tried a similar move in 1966, he was turned down by the Republicans. Neither Kennedy nor O'Brien wanted to be too closely associated with violating the custom. They hastily organized the Committee for National Unity, co-chaired by Harriman and such other party notables as Mrs. Martin Luther King, I. W. Abel of the United Steelworkers, Leonard Woodcock of the United Automobile Workers, Sargent Shriver and John D. Rockefeller IV.

The ever cautious Muskie still had misgivings. Perhaps it was the memory of George Romney, Republican frontrunner in 1967. Pressed to state his positions, Romney had come out with his famous "brainwashing" statement as to Vietnam, which doomed him in the primaries. Muskie was reluctant to become the favorite. As he geared up for the speech, he decided to call personally each of the other leading contenders—McGovern, Hughes, Humphrey, McCarthy and Bayh—to promise that the speech would be nonpolitical and to ask for their suggestions. By their stunned silences, he must have gauged just what an unusual and gigantic step toward the Presidency his appearance would be.

In retrospect, the success of Muskie's performance seemed to justify their presentiment. The speech went a

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long way toward solidifying his national reputation. Whether it was the breadth of his appeal, his new firmness on the issues, or his changed warm image, he seemed to gain considerable public support. As one female campaign worker in New York sighed, "He has such big, beautiful eyes." According to the Nielson ratings, only 8 per cent of the viewing audience tuned in that night, but the effect was cumulative.

The reserved New Englander had finally captured a beachhead with the media, and Muskie became a household word. The next evening, he was invited back on national television to discuss the election returns with Vice President Agnew. The following weekend, he was asked to discuss his future campaign plans on NBC's *Meet the Press*. Not much came of it except, when reminded that Sen. Albert Gore's defeat opened a seat on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, he said, "You might have given me an idea today." The next week, he graced the cover of *Newsweek*, and the week after, he became the cover story of *The New York Times Magazine*. The final accolade came on Thanksgiving eve, when he was the featured guest on the *Dick Cavett Show*. Emphasizing his humble Polish background, he had the gumption to criticize the reliance of more affluent politicians on television.

It is difficult to measure the effect on public opinion of such a media barrage. A comparison of the Gallup polls in October and November suggests that Muskie gained significantly, especially among Republicans and independents. Perhaps more important to the nomination are the party regulars. Such a conglomerate of national leaders as appeared on the Committee for National Unity could not fail to impress party leaders around the country. Reports toward the end of the year suggested that the New York delegation was moving to Muskie. The defeated Senator Tydings of Maryland was also rumored to have offered to work as Muskie's new campaign manager.

The question remains: who is the real Senator Muskie? The Kennedy forces apparently feel that he is theirs for the making. Muskie's national image and organization seem to support their contention. But there is still the cautious, unbending politician who addressed the people in Maine. The record indicates that, left to himself, Muskie remains a somewhat aloof conservative. His close adviser and former campaign manager says of him, "No one can really influence the true character and inner reserve of Ed Muskie."

Regardless of how one feels about the man, the way in which he was transformed into the unofficial Democratic nominee in 1972 raises some serious doubts. The way in which the party professionals and the media bypassed the other Democratic contenders and defied tradition goes beyond questions of propriety. It tends to substantiate existing fears as to the responsiveness of our political institutions to outside pressure. It does so at a time when these institutions are trying to meet new and almost overwhelming challenges.

Perhaps the widely heralded New Politics is not so very different from the old. Only the smoke-filled rooms are now populated with media men and their antiseptic graphics charts. As Mr. Dooley used to say, "Politics, me lords, is still th' same ol' spoort iv highway robb'ry." □

PAHLAVI UNIVERSITY

SHAH vs. BUREAUCRATS

G. H. MULLER
Mr. Muller was for three years a visiting professor in American Literature at Pahlavi University. He lives now in Berkeley, Calif.

During a trip to the United States in 1963, the Shah of Iran spoke with officials of the University of Pennsylvania on a project close to his heart—the transformation of a mediocre college in the southern part of Iran into a modern educational complex based on American models. Partly as a result of these talks, Pahlavi University was created in 1964, an academic showcase rising from the foundations of its inferior predecessor, blessed with the name of the dynasty that gave it life, sustained by copious oil revenues, and guided in its infancy by skilled professionals from the University of Pennsylvania, the Fulbright-Hays Commission and the USAID mission.

Pahlavi University was erected in Shiraz, one of the most gracious and elegant cities in Iran, and one of the richest in the nation's long cultural history. The institution is scattered throughout this city, a series of little worlds cunningly made. The College of Arts and Sciences is adjacent to the tomb of Hafez, Iran's greatest classical poet. The dormitories are clustered around Bagh-e-Eram, a beautiful garden graced by some of the tallest and stateliest cypresses in Iran; this garden belonged to indigenous tribal chiefs before the land was confiscated by Reza Shah Pahlavi, founder of the dynasty and father of the present Shah. Yet another section, the College of Agriculture, is located beyond the city on the road that runs northward to Persepolis, the ceremonial center of the ancient Persian Empire, and the site this year of the 2500th anniversary of the founding of the Persian monarchy.

Taken collectively, Pahlavi University's varied physical plant is an impressive testament to the nation's ability to mobilize its resources and accomplish its projects. Construction is one of the country's strengths, Iran having an obsession with conspicuous buildings. Yet construction is only the first stage in any university's development. At Pahlavi University, the real problems are behind the walls, in offices and conference rooms where the daily affairs of the school, as well as its long-range goals, are entrusted to officials who cannot emerge from the shackles

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of bureaucracy. In an atmosphere which does not encourage independence of thinking or brilliance in the execution of necessary educational reform, the impetus for instituting modern administrative practices is totally absent. Already, therefore, Pahlavi University is beset by an administrative crisis and, because the central government and its representatives influence the school's smallest activities, this crisis is political. All major decisions affecting the university's goals and directions are made in Tehran, and the continuance of any member of the educational community in Shiraz is based more upon his political agility than upon his academic competence.

There are at present four faculties at Pahlavi—arts and sciences, engineering, agriculture and medicine, each with its separate, well-developed complex, and two excellent hospitals, the Namazee and the Saadi, are associated with the university. A splendid library is so well financed by oil consortium grants that its staff cannot buy books fast enough to exhaust the annual appropriations. (I alone ordered more than 2,000 books for the library while I was a member of the faculty.) A university press publishes books in Persian and in English, and the Asia Institute, a center for Iranian studies, operates under university auspices. Arthur Upham Pope directed the Institute until his death two years ago; his successor is Richard Nelson Frey of Harvard, one of the three leading Iranologists in the world today.

Slightly fewer than 5,000 students now attend Pahlavi; when the central complex, being erected in the hills outside Shiraz, is completed in 1976, this number will probably triple. Last year, 110,000 high school seniors took the national university entrance examinations, competing for the less than 8,000 openings in the freshman classes of the eight leading universities. Of those accepted, Pahlavi took the best. On the basis of intelligence, a Pahlavi freshman is far superior to his average American counterpart; he is certainly better prepared in the sciences, and usually has had eight years of one, sometimes two, foreign languages. Most of these students, moreover, come from the top strata of Iranian society: tuition alone at Pahlavi is $200, and the average annual income is $135. Sadly, once these gifted and privileged young people enter Pahlavi, they are under little pressure to excel. It is almost impossible to be expelled for academic reasons, though students are frequently removed for political improprieties.

To the Western mind, procedure at this very substantial university seems bizarre, even Draconian. Students and faculty have no effective voice in establishing educational criteria, and the administration, charged with implementing plans that have been designed largely in the capital, can scarcely discharge its functions because of overstaffing, a lack of efficient office practices, and the overlapping and duplication of roles. Administrators at every level of university life recognize the virtues of inactivity. A bureaucracy is a form of government which refuses to admit mistakes, and the best way to assure the success of the system is to refuse to act in any concerted manner. No administrator at Pahlavi, not even the chancellor, will make a substantive decision unilaterally, although higher officials will perform personal favors for



The New Campus; Architect's Drawing

subordinates, providing these courtesies do not endanger their security. Of course, lower-echelon officials are by far the more vulnerable, and attempt to shift responsibility whenever possible. The chairman of a department will delegate authority among several members of his staff; or a dean will set up committees and conferences which meet periodically to handle, but rarely to resolve, minor problems. At all levels of the administration, paper work replaces action; forms are always being filled out, signed and countersigned, and routed between offices, until they come to rest in some overflowing file cabinet.

The practical results of this sort of administrative behavior are as predictable as they are depressing. Because of strict political control over the hiring of teachers, no department can hire promptly a professor whom it might consider a valuable addition to its staff. Departmental requests for personnel must be submitted to a college committee, then to the provost's office, and finally to the secret police. At every stage, the procedures inaugurated by the department are reduplicated; communications are poor and frequently administrative units do not cooperate. As a result, months can pass before a candidate is approved. The roster of people lost because of this administrative inefficiency is long and discouraging.

There is, then, a perennial hiring crisis at Pahlavi University, which, aggravated by political interference, prevents the institution from establishing a permanent staff. Few teachers remain for more than two or three years, and the tenure of administrators is frequently even shorter; there have been four deans of the College of Arts and Sciences in the past four years, of whom only one, an aspiring young Iranian politician with a doctorate in economics from Berkeley, was a trained administrator. He left after one year of relative progress to assume a high-ranking post in a Tehran ministry. Constant faculty attrition and rapid administrative change prevent a sense of educational continuity. In addition, the uncertainty of the hiring situation makes staff members mistrustful and innately conservative. They tend to anticipate attempts to dislodge them by ingratiating themselves with those whose political positions seem relatively secure. Inevitably, the

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university is marked by an allegiance to the *status quo*, and a fierce resistance to necessary administrative reform.

Resistance to administrative reform vexes all political life in Iran. It has been aggravated both by the government, which takes an ambiguous attitude toward change, and by the institutions and agencies themselves, which frequently refuse to carry out even such reforms as the government sanctions. The Shah has repeatedly stressed the need to decentralize decision making, in order to attain swifter and more effective responses to local problems and crises. Yet in practice, his calls for reform are effectively thwarted, and more often than not by his own loyal followers.

Power is highly centralized in Iran, and is not surrendered readily to local administrations. Thus in moments of crisis, the Pahlavi University administration is almost unable to handle any of its own problems. At present, most Iranian universities are on strike, a fact unnoticed in the Western press, because the news from Iran is so effectively controlled. None of these universities has the power to solve the strike situation; rather, a solution will be forced upon them in the traditional manner by outside political forces. In late May of 1970, for example, a strike occurred at Pahlavi University, principally because the students objected to an administrator suspected of corruption in the operation of the cafeteria. He had intensified this grievance by employing the student karate club as a mini-Gestapo to repress student criticism. After one dissenter had been seriously injured, the students went on strike, picking as propitious a time when the Chancellor, ex-Minister of Economy Hushang Nahavandi, was on his way to the United States to recruit teachers and to work out the details of a research exchange program with the University of Kansas.

The strike probably could have been defused by the provost, who wanted to shut the university and thus prevent a confrontation. However, he was ordered by authorities in Tehran to keep the university open. Subsequently, the army was called in to restore order; students were beaten indiscriminately, and more than seventy-five were arrested. Such force was not only excessive but entirely unnecessary; the students had been protesting in an orderly manner, and their strike was being monitored by an elite tactical police squad that was sensible enough not to engage the dissenters in battle.

Dismayed witnesses to this event included thirty exchange students from Kent State University, who earlier in the spring had awaited reports of the violence on their own campus. Now they were witnessing a repetition of events, but as powerless spectators, as guests in a country which carefully supervises the behavior of its foreign residents, and which in the case of the Kent State students closely observed their behavior by employing native student informers to follow their daily activities.

After this student rebellion, the karate club was disbanded, but the larger political effect was that students learned that the price of orderly protest is a broken head and possible incarceration. And yet these are the students from whom the Shah hopes to gain the economic and political resurrection of his country. They are rigorously selected people whose keen intelligence is apparent to any teacher who works with them, but their inclinatior are constantly thwarted by an inability to control the own destiny or to participate in the life of a developin university. They are frustrated by an unresponsive admir istrative machine, intimidated by the secret police, an neglected by their teachers, who never support them i their occasional protest against the system. These student feel increasingly that they function as so much crud human fiber, molded by an educational and political ap paratus into technicians trained to assume specific func tions in a developing industrial society; they are neve taught the virtues of a liberal education, which was maior purpose behind the creation of Pahlavi University

The debasement of educational criteria results of cours from political interference, but also from faculty failur to refine the curriculum. In the College of Engineering for example, the present undergraduate program cover five years. That additional year of preparation might seen laudable, but in fact engineering students at Pahlavi ar required to take courses which largely overlap in sub ject matter; and the fifth year is wasted. Lacking an ade quate academic environment, the faculties of the variou colleges have little desire to meddle with curriculum Indeed, the quality of instruction has been little improvec since the founding of Pahlavi University, and in some colleges, as the School of Medicine, it has steadily declined. In the mid-sixties, the School of Medicine, staffec by highly trained Americans and Iranians, was one of the best in the Middle East. Today, the foreign staff has for the most part left, and many of the most talented Iranian doctors have relocated in Tehran or in other countries.

With its rich physical plant, and with the mammoth central complex scheduled for completion in the mid-1970s, Pahlavi University's potential for growth is excellent. But the sad fact is that many people at Pahlavi choose to think that the Shah's determination to establish an institution patterned on the American educational system has been fulfilled—after all, the university has been staffed with administrators, faculty and students; what more could be wanted?

It is a measure of the strength of the Iranian bureaucracy that Pahlavi University was stripped of any possible autonomy at its inception, *despite* the fact that the Shah issued a special edict granting it independence. It seems apparent that the Shah, although he refuses to tolerate any hint of treason, is willing to take risks, but that his loyal followers are not. The Shah realizes that the Iranian bureaucracy frequently blocks the development of the country, and he frequently criticizes it; but even he is unable to transform it; indeed, he may well be a victim of his own reluctance to reduce the power of the central bureaucracy in Tehran.

As long as a political bureaucracy controls its destiny, there is little chance that Pahlavi University will become a viable educational institution. As long as *Savak*, the Iranian Secret Police, is permitted to operate with impunity on the campus, an academic environment free of political repression cannot be instituted. Perhaps that is why the University of Pennsylvania, to its credit, has refused to grant the school complete accreditation. One might ask

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why, in a country that is politically and economically stable, and where the dangers of revolution are remote, the secret police should be able to prevent any teacher from occupying a post, or arrest him, or intimidate him in more subtle ways. And obviously, the secret police can exert similar pressure on the students. Although it is generally not recognized as such, the Iranian Secret Police is one of the strongest political interest groups in Iran. Charged with the security of the country, it has overreached its authority to create a repressive political environment, one in little accord with the Shah's professed belief in the gradual democratization of the country.

It is not realistic to assume that a transformation in the activities of the secret police will come through organized resistance. More likely, it will occur either by a personal edict from the Shah, or from a sudden galvanization of university opinion in a moment of crisis and outrage. In either case, the task of political democratization will not be served. And from all indications, Pahlavi University will have to live with the secret police for some time: indeed the campus may never be freed from political interference and repression.

The results of political interference in university life, as Americans are beginning to learn at home, are usually disastrous. They lead to a disparagement of the values implicit in a liberal education and in the concept of education as an expansion of powers in the individual. The Pahlavi curriculum is in a shambles, and many areas, especially in the behavioral sciences and humanities, need immediate strengthening. Yet the administration, composed largely of Swiftean figures adept at political intrigue, remains unresponsive to student needs. Two years ago, some seventy students courageously submitted a petition requesting the establishment of a department of political science; not a single administrator was willing to treat the proposal seriously.

As a footnote to delusion, Pahlavi University was voted the best institution of higher education in Iran at a 1970 conference at the Caspian resort town of Ramsar, which was chaired by the Shah. For the first time, it eclipsed its more venerated rival, the University of Tehran. But the Pahlavi community should take little solace from its award, for the University of Tehran itself is in the grip of a bureaucratic paralysis which no administrators, including several appointed by the Shah, have been able to break. Pahlavi University, with its fragile ties with several American schools, and because it has been endowed with the Shah's own dream of educational greatness, may just possibly fulfill the promise of excellence. But it certainly does not deserve to be called, as it was by a leading bureaucrat, the "Harvard of the Middle East." Pahlavi is only at the beginning of its educational life, and the decisions being made today will determine the direction it takes in the future. At present, these decisions are being made by politicians rather than by skilled educationists, or by the university community. Strictly authoritarian, they prevent the creation of a laboratory in which Iran's youth, attuned to the technology of the West, sensitive to the incredible wealth of its own culture, and trained in the virtues of constitutional process, can prepare itself for the task of reanimating a nation that has known at least three great civilizations in the past. □

HOUSTON PACIFICA

BOMBS TO THE RIGHT OF THEM

NICHOLAS C. CHRISS

Mr. Chriss, Houston bureau chief of the Los Angeles Times, *was formerly on the news staff of the Tupelo (Miss.)* Daily Journal. *He has covered most of the major race stories in the South since 1954. Mr. Chriss has also been a foreign correspondent in London, Frankfurt and Berlin.*

Houston

A little more than a year ago, few people in Houston, or Texas, had heard of Pacifica or Larry Lee. So far as they were concerned, Pacifica might have been another weight-reducing salon and Larry Lee its sweet-talking manager. All that has changed, Pacifica owing much of its present fame to some local Klods of the Ku Klux Klan; the kind of people who did so much to help along various civil rights legislation with their bigoted violence. Almost everybody in the state, and many more across the country, now know that Larry Lee is the manager of KPFT-FM, 90.1 on your FM set; and that Pacifica is the rather esoteric group of subscriber-sponsored stations that has such programs as *Do Plants Have Feeling?*, *The Chiliastic Hideon*, *The Peanut Butter Program* and *Garage Sale*. And, they now know, Pacifica usually tells it like it is.

Pacifica's transmitter in Houston was bombed twice last year, in May and in October. It has been systematically harassed by right-wing extremists and its staffers say police protection was either inadequate or deliberately negligent. Lee, a former wire service reporter and *Texas Observer* associate editor, brought the idea of Pacifica to Houston in 1969. Scarcely anyone understood what he was talking about, and still fewer cared. It was an uphill battle because Texas is not California, where the Pacifica Foundation is based. KPFT-FM opened for business in February; three months later its transmitter was totally destroyed by a dynamite blast. For whatever solace it might provide, Federal Communications Commission officials told Lee his transmitter was probably the first to be blown up in the history of U.S. radio broadcasting. The FBI was urged to enter the case, but declined.

Sam Diaz, station engineer, said he usually checked the transmitter, outside the city limits, at about 11 each night. That's when the blast went off, but by good fortune Diaz was late. Damages amounted to about $25,000, all but $4,000 covered by insurance. There was more to come, and it was spreading. Various liberal, left-of-Center

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and hippie groups began to report increased harassment from Klansmen, particularly from one Jimmy Dale Hutto. Hutto was a dubious sort of local celebrity because he had once passed himself off as a "proletarian" to the SDS, which swept him up and cherished him for two months as a member and confidant.

One of the more exotic stories of right-wing menace and indifferent police protection came from Richard Atwater, a member of the hippie newspaper *Space City*:

> I was talking to a police dispatcher on the telephone at one time. A car had pulled up in front of the house and I looked down from a second-story window and saw a man in the passenger's seat with a *crossbow*. It was a big enormous thing. I called the police and as I was talking to the dispatcher [the car] came around the corner a second time, driving very slowly. And so I was giving a running account to the dispatcher when an arrow came through the front door. I gave him a description of the car, the license number, what direction they had turned after they fired on the office, and, you know, just laid it out, the whole thing. It was in broad daylight; it was like 6 o'clock in the morning. So they, of course, didn't apprehend anybody. Didn't see anybody doing anything wrong and sent a man by about ten minutes later to take a report. And he pulled the arrow out of the wall where it had rested.

Houston police, it seemed to Pacifica staffers, and many others too, spent a lot of time raiding X-rated movies, "adult" bookstands and places like the Zipper Lounge that feature porno skin flicks and nudie waitresses. All the time the city's murder rate climbs in sleazy little cafés where the patrons regularly assault one another on Saturday nights. Even friends of the police department were beginning to wonder if Chief Herman Short and his officers were more interested in protecting their morals rather than their lives.

After the first transmitter bombing Pacifica vowed to build a bigger and better mousetrap. Two construction firms contributed the materials. Listeners and sympathizers, especially from New York, sent in $4,000. There was an anonymous grant from someone in Houston for $25,000. The new concrete structure was surrounded by sandbags. There were *two* barbed wire fences; also hidden cameras for surveillance and silent alarms. In fact it was a bunker.

So Pacifica went back on the air. Then on October 6 the transmitter was bombed again, right in the middle of Arlo Guthrie singing *Alice's Restaurant*. The police called the blast "very professional," but damage was less than with the first bombing. However, this time it was much harder to get insurance coverage. And still no luck with the FBI, nor were local police getting anywhere. Lee and his staff began a campaign based on the slogan "Bucks not Bombs" and bumper stickers blossomed across the city, some in places unexpected. Lee campaigned hard, growing a vast and bushy beard and a Prince Valiant hairdo for the purpose, and set out to get Pacifica back on the air.

"The bombers have either killed this station or come quite close to it," he remarked. "Pacifica is in intensive care. It will take folk medicine in the form of support of our listeners and sponsors to pull it through. But if the bombers are caught and charged, they can have a radio program on Pacifica to express their point of view. They always could have had that, if they had asked us."

Houston was beginning to wake up. Several groups disgusted with the police, held a news conference. They disclosed that police had picked up two men near radio station KNUZ after that station had been warned of a bomb threat. KNUZ is located not far from the *Space City* office. Police had found three rifles in the car of the men, ammunition, four flares and three photos of Klansmen. The men later were released without charges. One of them was Jimmy Dale Hutto.

There were several more bombings, one of the targets being the black weekly newspaper *Forward Times*. Another explosion went off at a local architect's office, whose members did not have, or at any rate had not expressed, political views of any sort. The only explanation anyone could offer was that the office was in the *general area* of the city where some hippies lived, or that it was near a leather goods store and, as everyone knows, hippies like to wear leather.

It began to dawn on people in Houston, people who had never thought about it before, that dissent—any kind of dissent—was becoming risky. Maybe if someone didn't like your sideburns, or the color of your necktie or the length of your toenails, you might get bombed. There were tire slashings, shootings, beatings and the burning of crosses. The local papers made little outcry, and little was said by city hall. Nothing was heard from the city's booming industrial giants—Space City, U.S.A., hub of the petrochemical industry, with one of the best economic climates in the nation. Who would want to knock it?

The spirit of violence may have started several years ago when a group of off-duty Marine reservists waded into an anti-war parade and knocked hell out of the marchers. It may have been further inflamed by the Klan's "rat-sheet," listing persons objectionable to the Wizard's goons. One name was included because that person had a Pacifica bumper sticker. And the trouble may have been related to the $14 million surplus in 1969 that didn't go to the police force, which is 50 per cent undermanned.

Thomas J. Jordan of SAC said that Pacifica was not heard outside Houston, and was not a Conelrad station. Thus it was not eligible for FBI savvy. But finally, after great pressure from, among others, the National Association of Broadcasters, the FBI did move in and, using its time-honored method, found an informer.

Soon thereafter, on the basis of the informer's tips, the FBI and local police stopped a car 25 miles west of Houston, just a few days before the January 20th reopening of KPFT-FM. Police said the men were en route to California to bomb Pacifica stations there. In the car they found a loaded .45-caliber revolver and a quantity of Ku Klux Klan literature. And they also found Jimmy Dale Hutto, who was placed under a $100,000 bond and jailed.

So Pacifica went back on the Houston air a second time, picking up Arlo Guthrie and *Alice's Restaurant* right where the song had been broken by the last bomb blast. □

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BOOKS & THE ARTS

Confronting Reality With Reason

THE LONGER VIEW: Essays Toward a Critique of Political Economy. *By Paul A. Baran. Monthly Review Press. 444 pp. $8.50.*

PETER CLECAK
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Paul Baran was, above all, a Marxist intellectual committed to reason as the principal mode of understanding the historical process as a whole. He characterized the intellectual as "in essence a *social critic,* a person whose concern is to identify, to analyze, and in this way to help overcome the obstacles barring the way to the attainment of a better, more humane, and more rational social order. As such he becomes the conscience of society and the spokesman of such progressive forces as it contains in any given period of history." Hence, to the usual condition of being an intellectual —the desire "to tell the truth"—Baran adds a second: ". . . courage, readiness to carry on rational inquiry to wherever it may lead, to undertake 'ruthless criticism of everything that exists, ruthless in the sense that the criticism will not shrink either from its own conclusions or from conflict with the powers that be' (Marx)."

Far from being a hollow declaration, Baran's assessment of the responsibility of intellectuals was the credo by which he lived. Bitter personal experience taught him the precarious situation of the intellectual, as opposed to the generally comfortable position of the "intellect worker" who sells the labor of his head rather than that of his hands. As the only Marxist economist teaching in a major American university in the 1950s, Baran experienced the frustration and isolation of working in the numbing atmosphere of "the great American celebration." He was also persecuted by the administration at Stanford and by the federal government. The administrators froze his salary, forbade him to teach freshmen, and assured chuckle-headed alumni (guardians of liberal education) that every effort was being made to ease him out. And the government tried, ultimately without success, to deny him a passport.

But the American experience only confirmed Baran's estimate of the uneasy relationship between genuine intellectuals and the dominant forces of an irrational society. Earlier tests had prepared him for the cold-war years. Born in Russia in 1910, he studied in important European intellectual centers: the Plekhanov Institute in Moscow, Berlin, and the Frankfurt School for Social Research. In those times and places, too, Baran was plagued by the irrational historical forces he sought to understand. He left the Soviet Union in the late twenties because, after the accession of Stalin, serious intellectual work became impossible. And he found Germany in the thirties an inhospitable environment for a Marxist, a Jew, and an ex-member of the Young Communist League.

After an interlude in Warsaw and London as a sales representative for his uncle's timber business in Vilna, Baran came to America in 1939 intent upon an academic career. But the war intervened, delaying his plans for nearly a decade. Having taken a master's degree in economics at Harvard in 1941, he accepted a fellowship at the Brookings Institution in Washington, and thereafter held positions in the Office of Price Administration, the United States Strategic Bombing Survey and the Federal Reserve Board. In 1948 he went West to an academic post at Stanford where he lived and worked until his death in 1964. He was 54. Baran belonged to that small class of international intellectuals who, by the circumstances and the example of their lives, possess full rights to their unorthodox views. He did not simply call for courage; he embodied it throughout his long odyssey across Europe and finally to America where, in spite of obstacles and setbacks, he completed his major works.

Baran's postwar writings focus on what he regarded as "the three dominant themes of our age: the plight of underdeveloped countries in the shadow of the 'free world' "; "the vicissitudes of monopoly capitalism during its current period of decline and fall"; and "the outlook for the nascent socialist societies in Europe and Asia. . . ." *The Political Economy of Growth* (1956) represents Baran's most sustained effort to account for the absence of rapid economic growth in large areas of Latin America, Asia and Africa. *Monopoly Capital,* written with Paul Sweezy and published two years after Baran's death, provisionally charts the decline of American capitalism and prophesies its eventual fall. And *The Longer View,* a posthumous collection of some twenty essays, reviews and occasional pieces, presents Baran's most important explorations of the third principal theme: the prospects for Socialist development in the relatively advanced countries—the USSR and Eastern Europe —and in the backward Socialist nations, especially China and Cuba. The volume does much more: in addition to offering brief formulations of Baran's views on the decline of capitalism and the rise of socialism(s) in this epoch, it includes his writings on philosophy and method. *The Longer View* may thus serve as an introduction to Baran's thought or as a summation of his views.

The essays on Marxism and the commitment of intellectuals in *The Longer View* sketch out the philosophical perspectives that underlie and inform Baran's analyses of the "three dominant themes of our age." Although elements of his version of Marxism as a mode of historical analysis and vision are scattered throughout the collection, the fullest statement occurs in "On the Nature of Marxism" (1958). Baran contends that Marxism, contrary to the views of sectarians and dogmatists, was never intended to be primarily a "positive science" consisting of a set of empirically verifiable "statements about past and present facts, or a set of predictions about the shape or timing of future events." It was from the outset "an intellectual attitude . . . a philosophical position the fundamental principle of which is continuous, systematic, and comprehensive *confrontation of reality with reason.*"

As a general orientation toward human experience, Baran observes, the critique of reality by reason has guided progressive thought throughout Western history. Beginning within this tradition, Marx and Engels also added to it by translating ". . . the notions of both reality and reason from the metaphysical abstractions and idealistic assertions—the forms in which they appear in pre-Marxian thought—into living, concrete categories of real, continuously moving, continually changing, human existence." Subordinating philosophy to history,

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Marx and Engels used reason to understand and evaluate historical structures as a prelude to changing them.

Baran argues that the "meaning of reason" and the "nature of reality" are intertwined "aspects of historical development." In the "*long run* of the entire historical process," the "content and the injunctions of reason," as well as the structures of reality, are relative. The institution of slavery, for example, may be rational under one set of historical circumstances and not under another. In *historical* terms, slavery as a specific division of labor under conditions of extreme scarcity had a positive side: it permitted others to devote their full attention to philosophy, science and the arts. And even from the point of view of the slaves themselves, it was probably preferable to the pre-Greek alternatives: death by the sword or in the fire. As Baran puts it: ". . . viewed against the background of cannibalism the institution of slavery was a *reasonable* arrangement, a step forward in the evolution of reason."

This recognition, however, did not lead him to the impasse of skepticism; for though the content of reason was relative in the long run, it could be defined *approximately* in any particular historical period: "The determining factors are the level of social development, society's achieved fund of scientific insight, the accumulated wealth of practical human experience." Thus, for Baran, the concept of reason includes epistemological and axiological components: it is a critical instrument used to discern ways of embodying values in particular periods of history. He appropriates the general aims of reason from the main tradition of Western thought: the satisfaction of man's basic needs for food, clothing, housing, medical care and education; the need for useful work and fulfilling leisure; the need for freedom and creativity. But merely to proclaim these values without stipulating the historical conditions under which they may be realized, wholly or in part, amounted in his estimation to an abdication of the Marxist intellectual's primary responsibility of approximating the *content* of reason in the short run, at the intersection of the present and its possible futures. The trick, as he clearly understood, was to avoid the extremes of arid utopian thought beyond history and the "realistic" acceptance of existing social arrangements. Replying to a critique of his version of Marxism, Baran asserts that

> . . . What is . . . central to the Marxian position is the capacity and willingness to look beyond the immediately observable facts and to see the tree of the future in the tiny shoots barely perceptible in the present. It is the combination of historical vision and the courage to be utopian—with the vision sternly disciplined by an analysis of *tendencies* discernible at the present time, and with the utopia rendered concrete by the identification of the *social forces* that may be expected to further its realization.

Baran, however, did not regard the evolution of reason toward the distant end of shaping reality as a smooth, continuous, or wholly determined process. Nor did he indiscriminately justify every historical phenomenon merely on the grounds of its having occurred. Each historical system, he insisted, must be examined critically and empirically, assessed in the light of the changing injunctions of reason and the evolving structures of reality. Accepting Marx's general conception of uneven historical development as a point of departure, he maintained that in class societies, the exploiting class has a vital interest in preserving the existing structure of social relations. When its interests coincide with the short-run injunctions of reason, a period of progress ensues. But when "the particular interests of the ruling class come into conflict with the interests of society as a whole," the confrontation of reality with reason "reveals the irrationality of the existing social order." And the representatives of the *status quo* seek to preserve the essential mechanisms that insure the wealth, status, privilege and power of the few over the many by restricting genuine intellectual activity in a variety of ways, from outright suppression to more subtle forms of ideological manipulation and control. At such junctures, the intellectual "performs an overridingly important function": he serves "as a guidepost to the next steps in mankind's forward movement," helping the exploited classes to articulate what they experience, and to discover a way out—in extreme situations through a social revolution under the auspices of an emerging dominant class.

This abstract pattern of the growth and decline of social systems repeats itself with endless variations throughout history, *at least* until the abolition of capitalism. As an intellectual attitude, then, Marxism retains its contemporary American relevance, even in the absence of a group with the capacity and the will to overturn an irrational social system: "As long as capitalism lasts . . . Marxism can neither be discarded nor refuted. For Marxism is nothing if not a powerful magnifying glass under which the irrationality of the capitalist system protrudes in all of its monstrous forms."

According to Baran, these central assumptions about historical change enabled Marx to produce a comprehensive analysis of 19th-century capitalism and to project the vague outlines of a more rational Socialist alternative. Without minimizing Marx's positive contributions to the understanding of capitalism in his time, Baran refused to be bound by them, choosing instead to pursue his own studies of contemporary social systems. Retaining the critical method and aims of Marx, Baran went his own way, sharing with other flexible critics in that tradition a preoccupation with ". . . the *critical* appraisal of the capitalist order in the light of reason, that is to say in terms of its ability (or inability) to satisfy human needs, to provide for the growth and development of man."

His specific analyses of the irrationalities of capitalism and the potentialities of socialism in this epoch did, however, turn on Marx's general conception of historical development. The root metaphor of society as a dynamic whole with essential and inessential parts lies at the center of Baran's view of historical movement in our time. Thus he maintained that monopoly capitalism was irrational as a whole, however rational its parts may have become. And that various forms of socialism elsewhere in the

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Geoffrey Cook

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world were rational as a whole, in spite of the irrationalities of their parts. This highly abstract vision of the historical present as a dialectic between declining capitalist and rising Socialist nations required what Baran termed "the longer view."

To gauge the comparative rationality of these general social formations, he developed the concept of "economic surplus," first defined in an essay entitled "Economic Progress and Economic Surplus" (1953). Based on Marx's category of surplus value, Baran's more general definition of economic surplus enables the critic to estimate both the irrationality of a given society and its potential rationality under altered conditions.

For theoretical purposes, he projects three variants of economic surplus. The "*actual* economic surplus" is "the difference between society's *actual* current output and its *actual* current consumption." It is therefore equivalent to current saving and "finds its embodiment in assets of various kinds added to society's wealth during the period in question: productive facilities and inventories, foreign balances, and gold hoards." All socio-economic formations have generated some surplus, though its size and composition differ greatly within and among social systems.

"*Potential* economic surplus" constitutes "the difference between the output that *could* be produced in a given natural and technological environment with the help of *actually* employed productive resources and what might be regarded as *essential* consumption." If actual economic surplus can be approximately measured, potential economic surplus can only be estimated because its realization depends upon a reorganization of productive facilities and patterns of distribution, changes that usually require substantial reordering of the whole society. Still, the elements of the potential economic surplus may be roughly identified in a society's waste—the squandering of output by upper-income groups as well as the potential output lost through the existence of unemployed and unproductive workers and idle equipment. The actual economic surplus thus forms an index of society's existing freedom; the magnitude and utilization of surplus provides a crude though valuable measure of its irrationality, whereas the potential economic surplus suggests the material prospects for increased productivity and higher rationality. These two partially overlapping concepts constitute an abstract way of comparing what is with what could be.

Baran labels the third variant "*planned* economic surplus": it is "the difference between society's 'optimum' output attainable in a given technological and natural environment under conditions of planned 'optimal' utilization of all available productive resources—and some chosen 'optimal' volume of consumption." The concept of planned economic surplus, Baran notes, is relevant only to Socialist societies with very high levels of economic and social development, since it presupposes a large surplus, rationally planned and produced to meet the needs of everyone. With the entire process of production and consumption under rational control, a society would have unprecedented freedom to define the amount and kind of work required by any citizen against the criterion of his needs. Hence planned surplus posits optimal rather than maximal production, and optimal rather than minimal consumption. In such a context, "economic man," that shadowy caricature of human potentiality, would be replaced by new images of the whole man. Since no society had yet approached conditions under which the concept of planned economic surplus could be employed, however, it remained a purely critical notion, Baran's vague intimation of a mature socialism.

With these assumptions about the relations between reason and reality, Baran analyzed and assessed the "three dominant themes of our age": the dissolution of advanced capitalist societies, the condition of underdeveloped societies that compose the informal American empire, and the countries forging various modes of socialism. Presented most fully in *The Political Economy of Growth* and *Monopoly Capital*, his tentative conclusions may be all too briefly summarized here to suggest the broad outlines of his contemporary historical vision.

In *Monopoly Capital*, Baran and Sweezy argue that American society is irrational at its economic core. Dominated by a few corporate giants, the American economy generates more surplus than it can profitably absorb through the normal channels of capitalist consumption and investment: "Owing to the nature of price and cost policies of the giant corporations, there is a strong and persistent tendency of the surplus to rise," both absolutely over the past eighty years, and relatively, as a share of total output. In the absence of new outlets for the swelling surplus—principally, wars and epoch-making inventions—the system of monopoly capitalism tends toward stagnation.

To regulate and stimulate an otherwise erratic economy, the state must actively intervene in foreign and domestic affairs. Although it may in theory channel significant portions of the surplus into social services, the actual structure of economic and political power in America precludes more than token allocations for human welfare: massive amounts spent on housing, education, medical care and other pressing social needs would weaken the loosely structured class system that dominant groups strive to maintain. Faced with the economic need to absorb a rising part of a rising surplus, and the equally urgent political need to preserve the principal features of the social *status quo*, the system seeks irrational outlets at home and elsewhere: for example, foreign investment, excess consumption by the very rich, a multibillion dollar annual sales effort, and needless duplication of effort throughout the business world. And in the postwar era, Baran and Sweezy argue, America established a huge military complex to police a sprawling economic empire that condemns the satellite nations to perpetual misery and underdevelopment.

Although large, the actual economic surplus falls far short of the American potential (as evidenced by the emergency policies during World War II which significantly raised the total output of goods and services). Thus both the magnitude and the uses of the actual surplus run against the injunctions of reason in the short run: in a word, monopoly capitalism is an irrational and unreformable system characterized by inequality, waste and destructiveness.

The underdeveloped nations whose actual surplus is inadequate to meet even the barest needs for food, clothing and housing, cannot make "the steep ascent" as long as they remain under the domination of local oligarchies allied with multinational corporations based in the United States, Western Europe and Japan. Their only route of escape, Baran maintains in *The Political Economy of Growth*, lies in an alternative organization of resources, a social revolution that will permit redistribution of the actual economic surplus, and its expansion toward the potential surplus. By eliminating excessive private expenditures and establishing everyone's consumption at minimum levels, a backward nation can invest a portion of its limited surplus in agriculture initially, and subsequently in industry. Although Baran did not ignore the enormous personal sacrifices entailed by such a course, he nevertheless favored authoritarian forms of socialism on the ground that they constituted the most *reasonable* historical alternative for the majority of men in Africa, Asia and Latin America. "Socialism in a backward and underdeveloped country," he remarked, "has a powerful tendency to become a backward and underdeveloped socialism." It is nevertheless preferable to mass starvation and chaos.

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Although Baran never doubted that capitalism as a global system had utterly failed the test of reason in the 20th century, or that most backward countries required at least an economic form of "Stalinism" in order to survive and establish the conditions for less repressive varieties of socialism, his attitude toward the Soviet Union was ambivalent. He did not minimize the enormous economic and social achievements of the USSR during its first forty years. Beginning in circumstances of extreme backwardness and underdevelopment, it had survived the rigors of economic growth as well as the excesses of Stalin's dictatorship: the bloody suppression of all political opposition; the wholesale denial of elementary legal rights; the repression of intellectual and artistic freedom. But Baran argued in retrospect that even though industrialization and collectivization were crucial to Russia's growth, Stalin's stranglehold on the secret police, party and government apparatus after 1934 had resulted in needless misery and death for millions of innocent Soviet citizens.

After the first wave of de-Stalinization in the mid-fifties, Baran returned from the Soviet Union with hopes that the new phase of development would result in a "free socialist democracy," maintaining that the vast achievements of Stalinism had canceled out its authoritarian premises. The Soviet Union and other countries in Eastern Europe, he suggests in "Thoughts on the Great Debate" (1962),

> . . . are able not only to afford the abandonment of the policy of "forced marches" that was characteristic of the Stalin era; they *must* greatly liberalize the economic and social conditions prevailing in their societies if further economic, cultural, and political advancement is to be assured. For here, as elsewhere, there is a powerful dialectic at work: the very system of extreme pressure on consumption, of unquestioned subordination to authority, and of rigidly dogmatic concentration on principal targets, which was imposed by Stalin and which enabled the Soviet Union to get over the "hump" of initial industrialization—this very system has turned, in the current phase of history, into a prohibitive obstacle to further economic and social growth.

For instance, the highly centralized planning that was reasonable under conditions of extreme scarcity became irrational given the greater availability and variety of consumer goods. Similarly, the restriction of individual rights that may have been necessary after the initial burst of revolutionary enthusiasm had run down became a "formidable fetter on creativity and freedom in all areas of national life." Thus, in Baran's estimation, a measure of economic, political and cultural decentralization that would result in less social control and greater individual freedom had become a crucial prerequisite for further progress in the advanced Socialist nations. Liberalization constituted the next step in the "slow progress of reason."

A convincing assessment of Baran's stature cannot rest on a compressed summation of his philosophical presuppositions and his conclusions about the main drift of contemporary history. It would require, in addition to a critique of his central perspectives, an extended discussion of *The Political Economy of Growth* and *Monopoly Capital*, where Baran gives critical and empirical flesh to his philosophical abstractions. Moreover, there is the problem of locating Baran on a confusing critical landscape which lacks common assumptions, values and procedures: should he be compared primarily to other critics who share the strengths and weaknesses of Marx's method, or with his non-Marxist counterparts of the 1950s and 1960s?

To render him full justice, these questions would need to be refined and answered in considerable detail. My own assessment must therefore be partial, tentative and frankly subjective. Baran, in my view, remains one of the few interesting and durable American social critics of the cold-war period. Combining the personal resources of a highly disciplined mind with a powerful critical method, he focused on the most crucial problems of his time: the emerging patterns of world history. Compared to what typically passes for social criticism in this country, Baran obviously comes off well, if only by virtue of his method and high seriousness.

Compared to other radical critics of the decade, Baran comes off very well, since so much of their work proceeds from stubbornly anti-rational premises. Irrationality and naive utopian fantasies not only mark the proliferating radical claptrap—such facile and self-indulgent best-sellers as Jerry Rubin's *Do It!*, Abbie Hoffman's *Revolution for the Hell of It*, Tom Hayden's *Rebellion and Repression*, and Kate Millet's *Sexual Politics*: they also infect respected critics.

Generally resisting what C. Wright Mills termed "the intellectual default" of the 1950s, Baran also avoided the radical default of the 1960s, though he did not live through the disappointing final years of the decade. Apart from a first-rate critical intelligence and method, his main strengths were sanity and rationality, a generally balanced and steady view of the actual prospects for socialism around the world. The essay on the "Great Debate" exemplifies these merits. In Baran's view, the central issue dividing nations, parties and individuals in the Socialist movement (broadly conceived) was the problem of Socialist construction in various countries: can full socialism be achieved without the basic economic policies associated with Stalin? Moreover, are the economic policies of Stalinism inseparable from the "abuses and excesses of Stalin's rule," the complex of "repression, violence, and dogmatism" that plagued the USSR after the death of Lenin?

Unlike many Marxist critics associated with parties or movements, Baran insisted that the doctrinal dispute be analyzed critically and historically rather than discussed fruitlessly on purely ideological or ethical grounds. No single formula could be realistically proposed for countries with dissimilar historical conditions and options. Hence, the initial and most important theoretical distinction concerned the quite different stages of economic and social development in the various countries of the Socialist part of the world: by 1960 the Soviet Union and several nations in Eastern Europe had reached a point where the economic policies of Stalin (not to mention the social, political and cultural components) impeded the progress of reason, whereas countries like China still required a long period of individual and collective sacrifice to escape the morass of backwardness and underdevelopment. ". . . What constitutes a necessary and positive development in the Soviet Union's advance to a socialist democracy is wholly premature for China, which still has a long way to go until it reaches the Soviet Union's level of industrialization and per capita output." Under these circumstances, the "liquidation of austerity, relaxation of pressure on consumption, and a measure of 'demobilization' of national effort are certainly not on the immediate agenda."

Though Baran did not live to see China's "immediate agenda," it is safe to assume that he would have struck a balanced view of the Cultural Revolution. Nothing in his work suggests that he would have regarded that complex phenomenon as the gateway to communism, the social womb of a "new man." Nor do I think he would have condemned the experiment, for he lucidly delineated the narrow historical options confronting backward Socialist countries. His early analysis of the deepening Sino-Soviet conflict, which suggests the need for stern economic policies in China, also posits the hope that they might be administered without the social, political and cultural abuses associated with Stalin's rule. To the degree that Maoism

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

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

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fulfilled those injunctions, I believe he would have found the Cultural Revolution rational *on the whole*: it was a less painful historical alternative than protracted underdevelopment under capitalism, or the nightmare of Stalinism, understood in its ethical and social meanings.

But Baran also believed that the test of socialism in the longer view was its capacity to enlarge individual freedom. To become fully Socialist, countries had to devise democratic norms and institutions capable of releasing the best potentialities of men. The indispensable criterion of freedom under mature socialism, he maintained, presupposed a healthy tension between individual rights and social responsibilities. Any ideology which demanded a limitless sacrifice of self to the social whole amounted to a temporary strategy, representing, in large part, the heavy price of development. As a critic he insisted on ideals while trying to define the historical conditions for their progressive realization. It was this critical sanity, this capacity to discipline a utopian vision by identifying "the *social forces* that may be expected to further its realization" which generally set Baran apart from other critics of his time.

Baran also exhibited glaring weaknesses which were implicit in his special (though not highly original) version of Marxism. Abstracting from the bewildering particulars of experience, he projected large generalizations, and then qualified them through detailed empirical investigations. Frequently, however, the essentialist mode of criticism overpowered him: schematic patterns of the decline of capitalism and the rise of socialism clouded the complicated realities he sought to define. Unless delicately applied to concrete situations, the abstractions of surplus and the part-whole metaphor of social analysis may lead to excessively optimistic projections of Socialist potentialities and to overly pessimistic appraisals of capitalist societies.

Baran was not immune to the temptations of his method. For example, the high level of abstraction on which he typically worked caused him to overestimate the rate of democratization in the advanced Socialist countries. Having argued that the historical need for Stalinism had been transcended in the Soviet Union, he did not give sufficient weight to the inertia of institutional forces operating against the transition to a genuinely democratic socialism. In addition to miscalculating the rate of historical change, Baran may have also misjudged its direction. At least, he failed to specify the social and political forces capable

THE ENCOUNTER

Come close and hug me, strange faces,
Flesh-makers,
Treading down the grass beside me
In the world, where I am alone
To be with you, delicate-toothed,
Slack-jawed mothers.

Paul Zweig

of establishing a mature Socialist democracy in the USSR and throughout Eastern Europe.

Baran's political miscalculations primarily stemmed from an excessive faith in the capacity of Socialist planning to actualize the potential surplus: in the late 1950s, he thought that the Soviet Union would achieve the world's highest standard of living within a few decades. And he seriously overestimated the rate of Cuban growth in the early sixties. Moreover, by easing the transition to higher stages of socialism in each country, rapid economic growth would also obviate the conflict between advanced and underdeveloped Socialist countries. Had these economic expectations been fulfilled, liberalization might have come sooner and with less sacrifice throughout the Socialist parts of the world. In both instances, Baran's faulty economic projections are the result of a failure to add a sufficient number of qualifying political, social, cultural and ideological assumptions to the economic analysis. Had he done this, his economic predictions would have been more realistic. Without the safety valve of rapid growth, however, he would have had to face the crucially important theoretical and practical questions of whether the transition from authoritarian to democratic socialism is historically possible—even in the longer view.

Illuminating some aspects of the historical present, he thus concealed others. If Baran overestimated the rate of economic and social development in the Socialist countries—advanced and underdeveloped alike—he also failed to write convincingly about politics and social change in the West, especially in America. Though harboring no illusions about the Marxist Left (old or new) as a revolutionary force, Baran did not devote sufficient attention to American politics—mainly, I think, because he took the metaphor of the social whole and its parts too literally. Perceiving Socialist societies as rational as a whole, he tended to overrate their potentialities; regarding American society as irrational as a whole, he blurred the important short-run social changes and the corresponding political options that radicals must pursue, if only to survive.

Although Baran avoided the cul-de-sac of revolutionary sects, he nevertheless blinded himself to the search for medium-range political alternatives on the Left. He simply gave up on America and looked elsewhere for the beginnings of decent societies. As a result, he did not anticipate what strikes me as the principal political lesson of the sixties: namely, the need for American radicals to separate long-range analyses of the social whole from estimates of the "tendencies discernible at the present time." For neo-Marxist analyses of the social whole either preclude serious political action or evoke desperate, self-defeating gestures, whereas short-range estimates suggest a politics of survival and reform —a defense of civil rights and liberties against encroachment from the far Right and from zany sectors of the Left, and a militant pursuit of reforms, if only on local levels in the immediate future, to raise the quality of economic, social and cultural life of a multiplicity of groups, among them blacks, Chicanos, the poor, segments of the working class, the old, the young and women.

In the early sixties those who insisted on a revolutionary course of action "consistent" with their theoretical conception of the irrational "whole" either avoided American politics altogether or found their way into publicly harmless (though personally frustrating) sects. At present, however, the public and personal costs of acting out revolutionary fantasies are prohibitive. We cannot know how Baran would have addressed this central radical paradox. My own guess is that he would have defined the disparity between analyses of the social whole and the narrow prospects for immediate political action *as a paradox*, resisting both of the currently fashionable, "consistent" resolutions: the abandonment of Marxist perspectives or the adoption of the revolutionary anti-politics of a marginal group. In response to a *vaguely* similar situation in Germany nearly forty years ago, Baran joined the Social Democrats as a tactic of survival. Though it failed then (as roughly similar strategies may fail in the American seventies), Baran considered the move to be the most rational political alternative at the time. Whether his assessment of America at the beginning of a new decade would have persuaded him to advocate a similar course must remain an open question. We are poorer for not having his analysis, whatever his answer might have been. But his critical legacy survives, along with his example as a man. Avoiding radical fads and fashions, resisting political intimidation, Baran took his role as a Marxist intellectual seriously. And he performed it well. □

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DANCE / Nancy Goldner

Four Last Songs, a new ballet by Lorca Massine that was first presented by the New York City Ballet on January 21, is such a quiet, odd and loose kind of dream that one can easily imagine a slight ping causing the work to shatter into a thousand pieces, as quietly as it was born. And yet it grows stronger and bolder in memory, deriving its resilience, I suspect, from its very fragility. However slowly its spell goes to work, it does finally grip the imagination.

When the curtain rises seven dancers are exercising at a silver-colored *barre* at the back of the stage. One boy stands aside from the rest. A singer walks across the stage, as though in a trance. With the solitary boy's assistance, she steps onto a platform from which she will sing the *Four Last Songs* of Richard Strauss. The notes pour from her in a steady headlong rush of passion. There is no rhythm, just wave upon wave of sound. Now the dancers begin to move, one by one. But here is the strange thing: the delineation mark between action and inactivity is blurred, so that one is never quite sure when each individual started and stopped his little "variation." And since the dancers are randomly placed around the stage (or so it seems), one is also not quite able to anticipate where the action will be. Sometimes it happens stage center, which is the biggest surprise of all.

Whereas the overall patterns begin and end at unknown points, the movements themselves have a set life cycle. They begin with great energy and motivation and then dwindle and fade away, but without coming to a dead stop. Girls are lifted quickly in the air and return to the ground slowly, their heads and arms sinking. The boys jump forcefully onto one foot, their arms whipping around in front of them, and then they wither. Immediately then they turn sharply, but their erect bodies languidly melt into curved lines. All the while the dancers are ebbing and cresting, the music is creating tidal waves. A striking parallel relationship (separate but equal) between dancers and music thus develops, making the texture of the work more complex than if Massine had faced Strauss head on. Because he had no rhythmic structure to work with and might have destroyed the music's continuous flow had he worked phrase by phrase, Massine swallowed the score in one gulp and treated it impressionistically rather than literally. Once committed to that approach, he went the whole way. Instead of interpreting the score, he recreated it by having the dancers move as a polyphonic base to both the singer and orchestra. One exception occurred when a boy rotated his arms like a windmill, propelling them faster and faster. Because this movement was so imitative of the music (and, incidentally, reminiscent of what an uninhibited conductor's gesture might be), it was charming.

Four Last Songs is charged with statement, which might be the result of its polyphonic qualities. On the one hand, the soprano is bursting with yearning, nostalgia, sorrow, death. The dancers, however, die a thousand deaths, quietly, with reserve and sweetly. Each little death or last wisp of a movement triggers the beginning of a phrase somewhere else. The dancers keep bouncing back, although unassumingly. Whereas the singer's tones cut through the air, the dancers push their way through space. Images of a girl's palms pressing straight down while her leg rises sideways from the force of displaced air linger in my mind. The dancers are less impassioned but stronger than the soprano because, one senses, they are resigned to their fate, their wanderings. Indeed, when that one windmill boy would have flown like the music, the others rushed over to quell the disturbance and restore the sad calm. These people are compassionate. They are also stoical. At one point, each of the male dancers lifts two girls aloft simultaneously. Looking as though they are carrying the burden of the world, they nevertheless hold that pose for many seconds and with much grace, as if to say: as people this is our function, but how much more gentle life can be if we are gracious and contemplate rather than fight our predicament. In comparison to Strauss's impulsive and possibly neurotic overflow of sound, the dancers are Buddhas.

In the final moments of the ballet, the boy who ushers the singer onto the platform embraces her as she steps down from it. For dancer and singer to break through the convention of separation and then to acknowledge each other in such intimate and direct gesture is highly dramatic, if not slightly shocking. It is also a most poignant extension of the care and concern the dancers bestow upon one another, and it reinforces the sensation that these young innocents have found a wisdom, a stasis, within the turbulence of the songs and their own ebbing and cresting.

Because the work moves on pauses, retards and drifts, and operates so freely of the music and measured time, it will

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take a while before the dancers have thoroughly internalized the choreography. It must be remembered that they are Balanchine dancers, accustomed to move in time to musical beats, not heartbeats. Nevertheless they all performed beautifully, if tentatively, and with an appealing shyness and wonder, no doubt in reaction to the strange new world to which Massine had delivered them. At the performance I saw, Bonnie Moore, Susan Pilarre, and especially Robert Maiorano (whose task it was to embrace the singer, Joyce Mathis) were luminous. Miss Mathis sang adequately, but I envisage a duskier voice contrasting with Massine's dreamy meanderings.

Who would be interested in seeing the Australian ballet? Probably only those who have "a thing" about international festivals. Or those who remembered the "ballet miracle," as it was called, of spring 1969, at which time the Stuttgart Ballet "conquered," as we were told, the New World. Sol Hurok, who brought the Australians to America for a transcontinental tour, including a stop at the New York City Center from January 26 to February 7, did not invite us to participate in a Discovery this time round. The strategy for the Australians was just as efficient, though, if less brilliant. He simply advertised that Rudolf Nureyev and the Australian ballet would be appearing. That did it; the troupe had a sold-out season in New York.

Although Nureyev performed in the program of short ballets, his staging of *Don Quixote*, in which he also plays the hero, was the staple of the repertory. *Don Quixote* is an odd choice for one's bread and butter, but Nureyev's drawing power is so strong that it hardly matters what he dances in. By now the ballet is a corporate product, having been choreographed by Petipa, then revised by contemporary Russian choreographers, and now further arranged by Nureyev. One sees glimmers of Petipa's neat, perfect sequences, but for the most part the choreography is trivial, academic, rather than being in the pure classical style that Petipa developed; it is top-heavy with Spanish-style posture. Indeed, a person who did not have the program before him might have expected Carmen to burst on the scene and wondered why Bizet's score sounded so unfamiliar. Actually, Bizet would have been more appropriate than Minkus' pitter-patter. The story, too, goes in a different direction, for the title character serves merely as a sub-theme for the love story between Kitri and the barber Basilio, both lusty, comic Neopolitan types. Cervantes and Sophia Loren coexist only in the most strenuous suspension of disbelief.

It is Nureyev who dominates the show and almost makes one forget that *Don Quixote* is a ridiculous ballet. The core of Nureyev's fascination is his daring. Not content to do quick multiple turns, he makes the feat doubly hard by placing his raised leg at the knee instead of the calf. Double turns in the air must finish with feet properly tucked together, heel to toe. Jumps onto one foot must conclude with the raised leg really raised, waist high. At the performance I saw, he was able to jump the hurdles that he, as a dancer, not choreographer, set up on purpose, and he was magnificent. As Kitri, Lucette Aldous (another guest artist from Britain's Royal Ballet) was technically assured but a bit tough as the headstrong heroine. She danced with more muscle than verve.

Unlike the programs of short ballets, the nature of *Don Quixote* does not allow for an honest evaluation of the company. And when we consider the statistics of programming—*Don Quixote* was given eleven out of sixteen times, and of those eleven times guest artists Nureyev and Aldous performed eight times; Nureyev danced at all performances but three—we get an inkling of the intent of the Australian tour. □

ART

LAWRENCE ALLOWAY

Has it been noticed that this is an exceptional time for seeing old master drawings? At the Metropolitan Museum is the third and richest of the series, Drawings from New York Collections, arranged jointly with the Pierpont Morgan Library, which began in 1965. The present subject is "The 18th Century in Italy," meaning of course Venetian art in particular, which is covered with an apparently endless run of brilliant works. In Washington, at the National Gallery (until February 21; coming to the Wildenstein Gallery, New York, April 24-May 23) is a fine show of the recently discovered landscape drawings by Ingres. In Ottawa, at the National Gallery of Canada, a collection of Giambattista Tiepolo drawings from German collections (until March 21), has been arranged by George Knox, who was responsible for the catalogue of the Tiepolo bicentenary exhibition of drawings at the Fogg Museum in 1970. Last year, too, there was the sample at Wildenstein's Gallery of Italian drawings from the Ashmolean Museum. All in all, it is evidence of scholarly zeal and of spectator opportunity.

Both Tiepolo and Antonio Guardi benefited from working late in traditions of art that were well established but still viable, highly developed but not exhausted. Guardi, by using the formulas of Venetian landscape painting, was freed from the necessity to invent and could intensify what had previously been the secondary resource of autographic sensibility into a primary pictorial factor. The situation of Tiepolo is more complex, but he was indisputably the inheritor of the iconography and mechanics of the Grand Manner of decoration. Given his control of this knowledge, he achieved by manipulating it freely an exhilarating fluency. To Roger Fry, and other critics of the pre-Baroque, pre-Rococo revival period, "Tiepolo tended merely to repeat his [form type] without enriching it with fresh material." His figure studies are in a sense the outcome of the traditional problems of anatomy (getting it right) and composition (piecing together), but in Tiepolo's hands the routine of training became the means to create a luminous space that has no equal in art. In the 100-odd drawings at the Metropolitan, anatomical mass and iconographic specifics tremble at the edge of dissolution in light, but the iconographical plan is the license for all the flying figures and their mobility derives from the classical canon of gestures. Hence that sense in Tiepolo of nostalgic learning turning into sensual awareness.

Jacob Bean and Felice Stampfle, who arranged the show, point out in the excellent catalogue that "draughtsmen investigated, invented, or developed new subject matter that had been only sporadically treated in previous centuries: *scherzi di fantasia* (fantastic jokes . . .), scenes of contemporary life, caricatures, landscape capriccios and, in contrast . . . exact city views and landscapes." (The *scherzi* are represented by very good examples of G. D. Tiepolo's Punchinello series, the capriccio by Piranesi's prisons, and the exact views by Canaletto and Guardi, though the latter's work also includes many lyrical capriccios.) The uses of drawing as an independent mode, with its own resources supplementary to other media, continued to develop in the 19th century. Another genre, developed by drawing rather than by painting, was shown at the Metropolitan two years ago in "Visionary Architects," dealing with Boullée, Ledoux and Lequeu. Their expanded architectural drawings turned the capriccio into a program for revolutionary and utopian monuments. The pedagogic back-up of the 18th-century drawings is well done: a show of prints, a group of oil sketches (halfway between sketches on paper and

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inished paintings), and a coordinated display of preparatory drawings by Tiepolo linked to the frescoed ceiling to which they led in the Palazzo Clerici, Milan.

For a time it was hard to see Ingres unfiltered by the "neo-classicism" of the 1920s. Alfred Barr wrote in 1946, when discussing Picasso, that "the influence of Ingres may well be present in such drawings as the Vollard portrait." The facts of the matter had been put more accurately by Jean Cocteau in his Picasso essay (1923): "Nothing is more absurd than to quote Ingres on every occasion that a pencil faithfully reproduces a model. It is enough to look closely at a drawing by Ingres to see that it crackles with little touches, and the bursting of witty bombs."

The exhibition "Ingres in Rome" (circulated by the International Exhibitions Foundation, which is also circulating 'Old Master Drawings from Chatsworth") justifies Cocteau's description completely: Ingres' line is not smooth and continuous but notched and activated. These drawings, discarded by Ingres as incompatible with his ambitions as a figure painter, according to Hans Naef's catalogue, are almost all from the Musée Ingres, Montauban. Ingres went to Rome in 1806 with a four-year fellowship to the French Academy in the Villa Medici and stayed in Rome until 1820, though it cost him his fiancée in France. The show begins with the almost primitivistic view of his room in the pavilion S. Gaetano and other equally schematic views of the Villa Medici gardens. Gradually, the austere neoclassic line relaxes as Ingres used it to assimilate increasingly complex visual data. Most of the drawings, certainly all the best ones, are in pure pencil and it is absorbing to see how the hard neoclassic edge becomes discreetly ample and the forms inserted in ever more complex sequences.

The landscape of Rome, outside the Villa Medici that is, is constructed by Ingres with intersecting planes, hidden ground levels, and interrupted forms. He draws superbly the classical details of Roman architecture, but they are only details; his real subject is the intricate space of the narrow streets and the heaping up or trailing off of the buildings in factual, nonclassical aggregates. The voids, the sudden emptinesses in many of the drawings, act to focus attention on salient points, in a way analogous to our perception of real landscapes. This is an extraordinary step to have taken, by comparison with the absolutely intact and continuous chessboard ground plane that Canaletto and Belloto, for instance, maintained in their urban views of the preceding century.

George Kubler in *The Shape of Time*, defines landscape painting as rich but intermittent, "a millenary study of the luminous structure of landscape." He cites irregular but successive artists such as Hellenistic mural painters, Claude and Poussin, and Cézanne. The list is short and not fully historical but if there is a kind of Mediterranean-based classicism of natural form rather than a body of doctrine, these artists belong to it and so, absolutely, does Ingres on the basis of these drawings. □

THEATRE

HAROLD CLURMAN

Samuel Beckett's *Waiting for Godot*, first produced in Paris in 1953, had already won wide acclaim abroad when it was presented in New York three years later. Its reception here was hardly cordial—except for Bert Lahr's performance—and the play had a brief run. Since then it has been staged in virtually all our regional and university theatres, as well as at San Quentin prison. Books on Beckett have been published everywhere and college courses on contemporary drama never fail to make the play part of their required reading.

Godot has now returned to New York in a production directed by Alan Schneider, with Henderson Forsythe, Anthony Holland, Paul B. Price and Edward Winter (Sheridan Square Playhouse). Its reception is everything that its sponsors desire and deserve. The public and critical change within fourteen years from coolness or incomprehension to high respect merits special attention.

When I reviewed the play in *The Nation* in 1956 I wrote: "I was utterly absorbed and thoroughly enjoyed Samuel Beckett's already famous *Waiting for Godot*. It is necessary to begin this way . . . because much abstruse and quite simple nonsense will probably be written about this play. But even if I did not like the play, I should still admire it. . . . I think it a *masterpiece*." Now everyone calls it that.

Waiting for Godot is a turning point in the theatre history of our time, as Pirandello's *Six Characters in Search of an Author* was in 1921. It is original in both form and content. It is an abstract tragedy rendered as "vaudeville." Its characters are "clowns" whose antics convey cosmic despair. It calls life into question. It does not complain of injustice and suffering: it clamors to know their meaning—and finds none. It is a parable of total disenchantment, an anguished jest. A personal statement, not a thesis, it expresses the human impasse as men had come to sense it (especially in Europe) immediately after World War II—a state of mind that still prevails. There is in Beckett a faint suggestion that men were more confident and enjoyed greater spiritual ease in the "old days."

Beckett's mood can hardly be called "pessimistic" or bitter, for pessimism and bitterness are attitudes which imply reason and hope. *Godot* is jocose with a laughter lacking reverberation; its sallies seem to be directed into a hollow pit in which sound becomes obliterated. Its eloquence proceeds toward silence. Life is a frantic gesture with no shadow and no foreseeable destiny.

Still we are touched. There is passion in the play. Man is enveloped in a void, yet he endures. That is the folly which makes him "funny." "I can't go on like this," says one of the two wretched tramps of the play. "That's what you think," the other replies: They possess nothing but the consolation of their company in their common plight.

There is movement but no progress in their lives. Morning and night make little difference. The change of seasons adds nothing to their comfort. The masters of the world are oafs, those who are led are automatons; the first become blind, the second are struck dumb. There is nothing for the two tramps to look forward to except their own disappearance. But they don't disappear; they

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persist. Thus they take on heroic stature. They are admirable, Beckett implies, for they are aware of their condition and seek its meaning. They are waiting for an answer: "Godot."

"Let us do something, while we have the chance!" says the more conscious of the two. "It is not every day we are needed. Not indeed that we personally are needed. Others would meet the case equally well, if not better. To all mankind they were addressed, those cries for help still ringing in our ears! But at this place, at this moment of time, all mankind is us, whether we like it or not. Let us make the most of it before it is too late! Let us represent worthily for once the foul brood to which a cruel fate consigned us! . . . What are we doing here, *that* is the question. And we are blessed in this, that we happen to know the answer. Yes, in this immense confusion one thing alone is clear. We are waiting for Godot to come. . . . *We have kept our appointment and that's an end to that. We are not saints, but we have kept our appointment. How many people can boast as much?*" Man's (and Beckett's) superiority lies in the disquiet of his search for meaning. For all its mockery, *Waiting for Godot* is a prayer.

To avoid the seeming inertness or lack of "action" in the play, the new production works hard—too hard—to be dynamic: it is loud in tone, violent with activity. The two tramps, who for years have trudged the earth and whose feet ache in tight shoes, almost never sit down or rest. Speech is so rapid that the long and crucial passage, only parts of which I have quoted above, is barely intelligible: it cannot possibly sink in. Lucky, civilization's slave, whose thinking is nothing but a "taped" recording of all contemporary stereotypes—intellectual, commercial, clerical and trivial—delivers his patter in so strangulated a fashion that one misses most of it. It is true that Beckett's intention is to make the routine "wisdom" of the day absurd, but for this to have its full mechanical effect it should be distinctly heard.

Jazzing the play in this fashion, damages a good deal of its comedy and most of its pathos. But the audience presumably knows what it's all about when it enters the theatre. For one thing, it knows that it is a masterpiece: it has been repeatedly told so. It listens silently in reverent attention. As for a completely fitting theatric embodiment of *Godot*, we must still wait.

The Trial of the Catonsville Nine is an arrangement of the proceedings for performance, made by Daniel Berrigan of the Society of Jesus, one of the nine inculpated (Good Shepherd-Faith Church, 152 West 66 Street). Technically, it may be set down as an example of the "theatre of fact"; emotionally, it is an absorbing event of sobering impact. I urge everyone seriously concerned with life in the United States to see it.

The Catonsville Nine, whose leaders were two Catholic priests, Philip and Daniel Berrigan, comprised also a teacher, an artist, several social workers—people generally committed to the amelioration of conditions among the poor and the black in this country, in South America, Africa, the Dominican Republic, Mexico. Accordingly, they burned the 1-A files of draft cards at the Selective Service office of Catonsville, Md., in May 1968. It was a flagrant protest against our participation in the war in Vietnam.

The trial was in a sense legally pointless, for none of the nine denied having deliberately planned and carried out the burning. They hoped that their trial would serve to arouse the conscience of the country. If the jury were to acquit them, that vindication might be a sign that their fellow Americans also considered the war in Vietnam a crime. But they were found guilty (Baltimore, October 1968) and received sentences of from two to three and a half years.

What the play at the Good Shepherd-Faith Church makes clear is the abyss between the letter of the law and the moral spirit. It stirs us too with the recognition that there still remain actively upright men and women of conviction who are willing to stake their freedom for the well-being of others. They are engaged in a struggle with present evil.

These people, as they emerge in the play, are men and women of simple eloquence and unassuming dignity. Their words are not beclouded by slogans or verbalizations. Their idealism shames all evasion. One of the most interesting elements in the play is the demeanor of the judge, who represents the average decent citizen. He is irritated at first by what he believes to be the defendants' lack of logic and apparent prevarications. But as the trial proceeds he becomes increasingly troubled, anguished, very nearly desperate. We observe him in a state akin to spiritual crisis. The problem he faces is insoluble except by stout souls or by an upsurge of popular feeling to create a new interpretation of the law—new only as it becomes more congruous with the oldest laws of the world's religious faiths.

Under Gordon Davidson's tersely objective, unemphatically concrete direction, the whole company plays with admirable effortlessness. The actors do not sweat with sincerity. *The Trial of the Catonsville Nine* demonstrates what is meant by the theatre as rite: a spectacle justified by the experience of an entire community and fortified by its enactment. □

SONGS AND OTHER SONGS

In the barred wood the Whitethroat
sweet sweet sweet pensive whistler the Whitethroat
in my deep wood
in my barred wood

In the limed wood the Flycatcher
the breezy whistler and his sister the Veery his sister the Veery
vee - er - few vee - er - few streaked liquid whistler
in my limed wood
in my limed pitchy wood

All birds sing songs of purest joy so it seems
the Flycatcher the Veery the honeyed Sparrow

But of my own children's cries
which is the sweetest to me now
and which is the most bitter
in my barred wood
in my limed pitchy wood?

Robert Nichols

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

ACROSS

You might do it to a small fish, especially if an atavism. (9)
Primitivism in the extreme, it should be transparent. (5)
Called a form of municipal power? (7)
Take care of the 4- and 5-year olds at school, or just aspire to do so? (7)
Macauley said they drew a system of it from the poetry of Lord Byron. (6)
Speed in a secure place? (8)
An undeveloped branch to secure, when it comes to something we might try to balance. (6)
Potential disturbance caused by faulty tuners? (6)
Though Marcus is a nut, no problem involved! (8)
Had a feeling it could be made into a hat? (4)
The old man should have been good at landing fish! (6)
and 11 across Relative of a balsam made into part of a barrel? (6)
Are you bound to lie in one? (7)
Beseech in a patent reattachment. (7)
Skins of ducks, perhaps. (5)
Set apart. (9)

DOWN

, 17 and 13 What happens when you come to the end of the line at the farm? (It's certainly eventful, particularly for the college type.) (5,3,5,4)
Disavows something when in trances, possibly. (7)
3 Ah, this is just play! (10)
4 A Met hysteria starts out with a certain amount of color! (8)
5 Not exactly what one means by a red cent! (6)
6 Sir Robert, or possibly John of Troutbeck (with a coat of lemon, perhaps). (7)
7 Lettuce is the less dangerous type. (7)
8 Acts conciliatory about tea, by the sound of it—or at least contemplates it. (9)
14 How Holmes implied one might be eating early? (10)
15 Not completely suited with one, though you might pretend to do so. (4-5)
17 See 1 down.
19 Told about having 11? (7)
21 Modulate the voice, to say *amo, amas, amat,* etc. (7)
22 It's not good about the way one traditionally acted on Saturday night! (6)
26 TV shows might be and should be chided. (5)
27 Such display with 16 might be concerned with trifles. (4)

SOLUTION TO PUZZLE NO. 1381

ACROSS: 1 Mao Tse-tung; 10 Leisure; 11 Realism; 12 and 6 Club head; 13 Adjunction; 15 Letters; 16 Effendi; 17 Rapallo; 20 Overlap; 22 Ear trumpet; 23 Coda; 25 Gleaner; 26 Silicic; 27 Task; 28 Chatterbox. DOWN: 1 Molecular weight; 2 Oviduct; 3 Spud; 4 and 19 The Ides of March; 5 Nurture; 7 Edition; 8 Dementia praecox; 9 Fancy Free; 14 Declaring; 18 Parleys; 20 Overset; 21 Lion cub; 24 Flue.

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

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